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Antitrust analysis in merger and monopolization cases is funda-
mentally a quest to determine whether a firm or a group of firms 1 has 
or may gain market power.2 One important, indeed indispensable, 
aspect of that quest is assessing the competitive significance of fringe 
competitors and potential entrants in limiting the ability of the major 
incumbents to maintain prices above a competitive level. Conditions 
affecting entry have been a subject of great debate in the economic 
community. Virtually all economists agree, however, that a firm will 
have no meaningful degree of market power if fringe competitors 
can expand capacity promptly or new firms can enter the market 
quickly with no disadvantage.3 Conversely, even with a market 
share much smaller than that traditionally viewed as "monopolistic," 
a firm or group of firms may be able to maintain prices far above a 
competitive level if small incumbents and potential entrants face sig-
nificant disadvantages.4 
1. A group of firms engaged in explicit coordination or acting in an interdependent (oligo-
polistic) manner may have market power analogous to that of a single firm with their com-
bined share of the market. 
2. The term "market power'' refers to the ability ofa firm (or group of firms, actingjointly) 
to maintain price above a competitive level by restricting output. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST 
LAW 8-10 (1976). In a perfectly competitive market, all firms will be compelled to sell at a 
price equal to the long-run marginal cost of production including a return on capital sufficient 
to attract the necessary capital investment. The greater the extent to which a firm can hold 
price above cost without losing most of its sales and the longer it can do so, the more substan-
tial its market power. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW f 501 (1978). 
3. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcONOMIC PERFOR-
MANCE 11, 252 (2d ed. 1980)("sellers have little or no enduring power over price when entry 
barriers are nonexistent"); Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Case.i; 94 HARV', L. 
REv. 937, 948-50 (1981). 
4. Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 950-51. For a firm to have substantial market power, 
purchasers must also be unlikely to switch to substitutes except at prices significantly above 
cost. 
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These observations have extremely important implications for 
antitrust policy and litigation. Without a coherent framework for 
assessing the conditions that affect the ability of fringe competitors 
and potential entrants to limit the pricing or output flexibility of ma-
jor incumbent firms - conditions that I will call "mobility factors"5 
- there is a substantial risk of distorting the development and appli-
cation of the antitrust laws. By placing undue reliance on market 
shares alone, the law may prohibit transactions and practices having 
virtually no prospect of enhancing market power while transactions 
and practices that have substantial anticompetitive effects are ig-
nored. Indeed, in many instances, the failure of the courts and anti-
trust enforcement agencies to comprehend the competitive 
significance of "mobility factors" may already have produced just 
such a result. 6 
Even where significant market power is clearly present, consider-
ation of the pertinent "mobility factors" is essential to determine 
5. The term "mobility factors" encompasses all conditions that may affect the ability of 
actual or potential competitors to keep the dominant incumbents from maintaining price 
above a competitive level for some period of time. Such "factors" would include conditions 
that have traditionally been referred to as "entry barriers" in the economic and legal literature. 
I use the term "mobility factors" instead because "entry barriers" has two unfortunate 
connotations. First, it implies that only conditions faced by new entrants are important when, 
in fact, those faced by fringe competitors or firms in other segments of an industry may often 
be more important in assessing the major incumbents' market power. See Caves & Porter, 
From Entry Barriers lo Mobility Dalliers: Conjectural .Decisions and Con/rived .Deterrence to 
New Compelilion, 91 QJ. ECON. 241 (1977). 
Second, the term "entry barriers" has often been used by courts and commentators to indi-
cate conditions that should be targets of antitrust enforcement. Many conditions that confer 
market power on dominant incumbents, however, create or result from efficiencies. Attempt-
ing to eliminate those conditions would therefore be harmful to consumer welfare. See Part I-
C infta. 
6. The past failure of the courts and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to understand 
the competitive significance of "mobility factors" is exemplified by their drastically different 
approaches to market power in different types of merger cases. Repeatedly througluhe years 
the courts and the FTC have prohibited horizontal and vertical mergers involving small 
(sometimes tiny) increases in concentration or foreclosure in markets where the rapidity and 
ease of entry (or fringe expansion) precluded any meaningful degree of market power. See, 
e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270,281 (1966)(pre-merger market shares of 
4.7% and 4.2% and four-firm concentration 24.4% in retail grocery market); Brown Shoe v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)(foreclosure of 2% or less in shoe manufacturing and retail-
ing); Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973)(pre-
merger shares of 23% and 1 % and four-firm concentration of about 50% in cabinet hardware 
market). 
However, in potential competition cases, especially since United States v. Marine Bancor-
poration, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974), the courts have permitted mergers that portend an increase 
in the incumbent firms' market power. Removal of one of the very few firms capable of entry 
into a highly concentrated market will tend to have the same effect as raising barriers to entry. 
See text at notes 77-78, infta. Unfortunately, the courts have failed to recognize that the more 
difficult entry would be for the firm most capable of entry, the more important that firm's 
continued presence on the edge of the concentrated market is in limiting the incumbent firms' 
market power. See, e.g., United States v. Siemens Corp., 621 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1980); Raybes-
tos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Hi-Shear Industries, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1122 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
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what, if any, government intervention or judicial action is appropri-
ate. That the market power arises because the dominant firm has 
efficiency advantages over fringe firms and potential entrants - such 
as lower costs, better quality, or a wider product line - may indicate 
that any attempt to reduce its market power will be detrimental to 
consumers. Whether such is the case or not depends on whether the 
actions by the dominant firm (or firms) that created or heightened 
the disadvantage were necessary to achieve or maintain efficiencies. 7 
(Of course, one should be particularly vigilant in such situations to 
assure that, whatever the source of their market power, the dominant 
:firms do not take actions or establish mechanisms that facilitate col-
lusion.) Likewise, the law should not stand in the way of mergers 
between disadvantaged competitors that enable them to achieve sig-
nificant economies necessary to compete effectively with the domi-
nant incumbents. 8 Rational consideration of "mobility factors" is 
thus essential to assure that advantages resulting from efficiencies are 
not eliminated by government intervention, on the one hand, and 
that the advantaged firms have competitive incentives to pass on the 
benefits of such efficiencies to the consuming public, on the other. 
While analysis of mobility factors is often critical in ascertaining 
the degree of market power and in determining the appropriate 
course for judicial action in structural cases,9 meaningful assessment 
7. According to Bork, actions that disadvantage competitors should not be prohibited "un-
less deliberate predation can be proved." R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 160 (1978). He 
argues that all other "exclusionary" actions relate to superior efficiency. Id. The fundamental 
problem with Bork's formulation is not only that it appears to require proof of the alleged 
predator's state of mind but it also assumes that he would recognize (or even consider) whether 
actions designed to obtain an advantage over competitors would or would not increase effi-
ciency. A much more direct and realistic approach is to determine whether the conduct was 
necessary to achieve or maintain efficiencies. At one point, Bork appears to recognize this in 
noting that predatory intent could be demonstrated through "evidence that the conduct was 
not related to any apparent efficiency." Id. at 157. 
8. The increasing scholarly support for an "economies defense" in merger cases has tended 
to obscure the fact that many (perhaps most) mergers which enable the merging firms to 
achieve significantly greater efficiency are likely to increase competition, not reduce it. Merg-
ing .firms that individually have a material disadvantage vis-a-vis the dominant incumbents are 
likely to be "price-followers." Permitting them to overcome their disadvantage by merger pro-
motes competition by increasing the number of .firms that determine the market price. 4 P. 
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at ~ 940; Edwards, Joffe, Kolasky, McGowan, Mendez-
Penate, Ardover, Proger, Soloman & Toepke, Proposed Revisions of the Justice J)epartment's 
Merger Guidelines, 81 CoLUM. L. REV. 1543, 1560-64 (1981) (hereinafter cited as "Edwards"). 
9. With the exception of some horizontal merger cases, the determinative issues in all types 
of structural antitrust cases likely to be litigated relate primarily to mobility factors. See notes 
68-92 iefra and accompanying text. 
The recently promulgated Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice highlight the 
importance of entry conditions. Barriers to entry are the principal focus of inquiry under the 
Guidelines' standards for potential competition and most vertical mergers. While understand-
ably the threshold consideration regarding horizontal mergers is still market shares and con-
centration, both the Department and the Federal Trade Commission now indicate that "the 
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of mobility factors has historically been neglected in antitrust litiga-
tion. To be sure, much trial time is usually devoted to the develop-
ment of evidence indicating how "difficult" it is to enter or compete 
and listing all the steps a new entrant must take to enter. But seldom 
is the evidence presented or analyzed in a manner that permits any 
assessment of the degree of pricing flexibility major incumbents en-
joy or the extent of any efficiencies that may be involved.10 As a 
consequence, the courts and the Federal Trade Commission have 
generally considered entry conditions (or other mobility factors) only 
in the most superficial and confused manner, usually to buttress de-
cisions made primarily on the·basis of market share data.11 This 
experience - as well as the ongoing debate in the economic commu-
nity over entry barriers - has led distinguished commentators of 
very different persuasions to advocate that mobility factors be largely 
ignored in antitrust litigation.12 While they all recognize that such 
factors are important, 13 these commentators fear that judicial consid-
eration of conditions affecting entry or expansion may lead either to 
the reduction of efficiencies or to the further complication of already 
complex litigation. 
That proposals to disregard mobility factors in litigation are be-
ing advanced now - when there is increased recognition that mobil-
issue of entry barriers is perhaps the most important" non-quantitative factor. U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice Merger Guidelines 21-22 (June 14, 1982)(copy on file with the Michigan Law 
Review); Statement of Federal Trade Commission Concerning Horizontal Mergers S (June 14, 
1982){copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
10. That many firms would have to devote considerable time, effort, and capital to enter a 
market on an efficient scale (and that some firms may face great difficulties) does not necessar-
ily mean that incumbents can raise prices above a competitive level. As explained in Part 11-B, 
infra, incumbent firms will only be able to maintain price above lowest attainable cost- that 
is, have pricing flexibility - where the firms most capable of entry would have higher unit 
costs than the dominant incumbents and considerable time would be required to enter and 
erode that cost disadvantage. See R. POSNER, Sllpra note 2, at 59. 
11. 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at~ 917c. See Part I-B-1, infra. 
12. Areeda and Turner contend that entry barrier$ should not be directly considered in 
horizontal and vertical merger cases. The sole evidence they would allow concerning the ease 
( or difficulty) of entry would be that showing the extent of recent entry - an extremely unreli-
able indicator of the degree of market power (see text at note 73 infra). Id. at ~~ 907c, 917, 
1015. 
Bork and Posner would also severely limit judicial consideration of mobility factors both 
because they consider them "an intractable subject of litigation" and because the courts have 
often viewed efficiency-related mobility factors as anticompetitive entry barriers. See R. 
BoRK, supra note 7, at 195-96, 310-29; R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 112, 122-23. 
13. "Substantial market power can persist only if there are significant and continuing bar-
riers to entry." 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at ~ SOS. And, while Posner views 
examination of mobility factors as impractical, his recent article (co-authored with Landes) 
demonstrates that ascertaining the ability of new firms to enter a market is critical in assessing 
market power. Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 950. He and Bork also criticize merger 
decisions that ignore ease of entry. See R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 106; R. BORK, supra note 
7, at 212. 
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ity factors must be analyzed to assess the extent of market power and 
to evaluate efficiency considerations in antitrust cases - indicates 
the substantial conflict inherent in current approaches to antitrust 
analysis. As discussed in Part I of this Article, that conflict results 
from the basic misconceptions courts and antitrust enforcement 
agencies have had about "entry barriers" .and the absence of a logi-
cal, economically-sound framework for evaluating mobility factors 
in antitrust litigation. The problem is compounded by the common 
perception that the information necessary to assess the competitive 
significance of any purported mobility factor is usually difficult, if 
not impossible, to obtain. The fact is that a mobility factor which 
causes a significant disadvantage or delay is not an economic ab-
straction of little importance to businessmen. Indeed, it is usually 
something that firms in the market and those considering entry, as 
well as businesses in related industries, have had to examine closely 
in making major investment decisions. If anything, then, the com-
petitive effects of mobility factors should be at least as ascertainable 
as the bounds of the market and the potential for coordination, 14 the 
issues which are usually determinative in structural cases. 
To assist courts and litigants in developing and utilizing informa-
tion on mobility factors in a meaningful manner, I have attempted in 
this Article to outline a basic approach for analyzing the competitive 
and efficiency significance of mobility factors in a litigative context. 
In Part I, I lay the necessary foundation: discussing the importance 
of mobility factors in accepted economic theory, explaining the 
sources of the current confusion and controversy about "entry barri-
ers" and deriving from the debate areas of fundamental agreement 
among economists. Building on this common ground, I develop in 
14. The bounds of a market are often elusive because they are rarely capable of any clear 
demarcation. Almost inevitably some firms outside the market will be able to compete for 
some customers. Firms within the market will seldom be equally competitive with each other 
and different firms (within and without the market) will usually have different competitive 
ranks, advantages, and disadvantages. Markovits, Predicting /he Competitive impact of Hori-
zon/al Mergers in a Monopolislically 'Competitive World: A Non-Markel-Oriented Proposal and 
Crili9ue ef the Markel JJejinilion-Markel Share-Markel Concentration Approach, 56 TEXAS L. 
REv. 587, 727 (1978). Indeed, some have suggested use of two or three alternative market 
definitions to limit the arbitrariness inherent in assessing competition from the perspective of a 
single market. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK Of' THE LAW Of' ANTITRUST § 12 at 42-43 (1977). 
Similarly, the potential for a given level of concentration to facilitate overt or tacit collu-
sion is extremely unclear. "While there is some support [in the economic community] for the 
proposition that mergers involving firms with very large market shares harm competition and 
mergers involving firms with very small market shares do not, there is a vast sea of ambiguity 
in between." Edwards, supra note 8, at 1551. Indeed, it is likely that a number of factors in 
addition to market concentration affect the potential for ~ter-firm coordination, including the 
ability of fringe competitors to expand and of potential entrants to enter rapidly. See R. Pos-
NER, supra note 2, at 55-61 ("[N]o responsible economist would claim today that concentration 
was the only factor predisposing a market to collusion." Id at 56), 
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Part II a basic approach to consideration of mobility factors in struc-
tural cases. Examininr; current legal standards applicable to monop-
olization and merger cases, I demonstrate that, in most types of 
structural cases, the issues that should be determinative relate pri-
marily, if not exclusively, to mobility factors. Then, bringing to-
gether the basic insights of the two major schools of economic 
thought, 15 I construct a simplified framework for ascertaining the 
competitive significance of individual mobility factors. By focusing 
attention on determining which of three possible effects a mobility 
factor may have, the analytical framework should assist courts and 
litigants in addressing the crucial issues: how a particular mobility 
factor enables major incumbents to maintain prices above a competi-
tive level and to what extent it enables them to do so. Part III ex-
plains how mobility factor analysis can be used in litigation to 
develop rough estimates of the degree and duration of market power 
as well as estimates of the increased efficiencies that may result from 
a merger. Part III also demonstrates that, by using a disciplined ap-
proach to mobility factor analysis from the pre-trial stage, courts can 
better manage and streamline litigation. 
l. PERSPECTIVES ON THE ROLE OF MOBILITY FACTORS IN 
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 
A. Economic Theory: Mobility Factors Essential in Assessing 
Market Power 
Broadly accepted tenets of mainstream microeconomic theory es-
tablish the importance of mobility factors in assessing market power. 
A firm or a group of firms acting jointly can maintain a significant 
and persistent deviation of price from cost only where three condi-
tions exist together: (1) purchasers cannot readily switch to substi-
tutes as prices rise; (2) actual competitors are unlikely to respond 
promptly to higher prices by increasing their output; and (3) the 
firms best situated to enter the market are not likely to enter until 
incumbents raise price substantially above cost. None of these pre-
conditions for market power, of course, is absolute. Given a suffi-
ciently high price and an adequate period of time, purchasers will 
switch to substitutes, 16 potential entrants will enter the market and 
15. The foundations of the so-called "Chicago" and "Harvard" schools of economic and 
antitrust thought - as well as their basic differences - are described in Posner, The Chicago 
School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. RE.v. 925 (1979). 
16. The responsiveness of quantity demanded to a change in price is termed "elasticity of 
demand." Firm elasticity of demand refers to the impact of a price change on an individual 
firm's demand. Market elasticity of demand refers to the impact of a price change on the total 
quantity demanded from all firms in the market. Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 940 n.8. 
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actual competitors (even those previously colluding with the domi-
nant incumbents) will find it profitable to increase output. 17 Conse-
quently, in assessing the incumbent firms' freedom to restrict output 
and thereby raise price, one must consider the temporal and quanti-
tative dimensions of each condition: what price will prompt, and 
how long it will take for, purchasers to shift, new sellers to enter, or 
rivals to expand production.18 
Although the restraint on the major incumbents' market power 
resulting from the ability of others to increase output is often dis-
cussed in terms of "entry barriers,"19 the distinction between actual 
competitors on the fringe of the market and potential entrants may 
often be immaterial in evaluating the market power of the dominant 
incumbents.20 As Posner and Scherer have observed, it is the actual 
or threatened increase in market supply that compels the established 
firms to price competitively. Whether the increased output results 
from expansion by a firm already producing the commodity or from 
a new entrant's commencement of production makes virtually no 
difference.21 Moreover, where fringe firms cannot expand production 
promptly or face significant disadvantages vis-a-vis the major in-
cumbents, these difficulties usually result from the very factors that 
inhibit the ability of firms outside the market to enter and compete 
on a profitable basis.22 Consequently, as Scherer observed, 
17. The responsiveness of the quantity supplied to a change in price is termed "elasticity of 
supply." Id. at 944 n.17. 
18. The most immediate check on a firm attempting to raise price by restricting supply is 
usually the ability of existing competitors to increase output using productive facilities already 
in place. Consequently, measuring market shares in terms of capacity (at least that which can 
be used without increasing per unit cost) may often provide a better indicator of a firm's ability 
to charge supracompetitive prices than computing market shares in terms of sales. Id. at 949-
50. 
19. See, e.g., 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at ~ 409; J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 27, 251-301 (2d ed. 1968). 
20. Traditional entry theory assumes that all incumbent firms in an industry are identical 
in all economically important respects except for size. As Caves and Porter have recognized, 
however, that may often not be the case. Within an industry there may be various groups of 
firms, each group having somewhat different structural characteristics. Firms in each group 
may face "barriers" to mobility into other groups; different groups may have varying degrees 
of protection from totally new entry. Caves & Porter, supra note 5, at 249-57. 
The importance of considering factors that limit mobility or expansion of non-dominant 
firms in a market ("fringe competitors") is indicated by the studies showing persistent differ-
ences in profit rates between firms with large market shares and those having small market 
shares in the same industry. Id. at 252; Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly in 
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 164, 177-80 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & 
J. Weston, eds., 1974); Demsetz, Indust,y Structure, Market .Rival,y, and Public Policy, 16 J.L. 
& ECON. I (1973). 
21. F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 252; R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 92. 
22. "[BJarriers to mobility between groups [of incumbent firmsJ rest on the same structural 
features as barriers to entry into any group from outside the industry." Caves & Porter, supra 
note 5, at 250 (emphasis in original).• 
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"[s]erious and persistent monopolistic deviations of price from cost 
are likely only when there are substantial barriers to the entry of new 
competition and the expansion of fringe rivals."23 
While most antitrust treatises recognize that market power de-
pends on some inhibition to new entry, few acknowledge the func-
tional relationship between mobility factors and the market share of 
the dominant firms. In this respect, the recent article by Landes and 
Posner is especially informative.24 It demonstrates-on the basis of 
well-accepted economic theory - that ascertaining both the pres-
ence and the degree of market power enjoyed by the dominant firms 
requires not only a consideration of their market share but also the 
market elasticity of demand and the supply elasticity of fringe com-
petitors and potential entrants. In part, the Landes-Posner discus-
sion reinforces the notion that the prerequisites for market power 
include low market elasticities of demand and supply. For example, 
a firm with even 80% of the market will have little or no market 
power in situations where either many fringe competitors can rapidly 
and substantially increase output without a significant unit cost dis-
advantage or customers will switch to other products at prices 
slightly above a competitive level.25 
Posner and Landes also show, using the following example, that 
a firm need not have a very large market share to possess market 
power. Assume a market includes a firm having 40% of the sales, 
that the market demand is highly inelastic (0.5 elasticity factor), that 
other firms in the market are price-takers and that elasticity of sup-
ply is low (0.5). In that situation, the inability of fringe competitors 
or potential entrants to check the major incumbent's pricing flex-
ibility would enable it to charge a price double the competitive level 
-despite having only a 40% share of the market. 26 With a compara-
ble market share, a group of smaller firms acting in a tight cartel or 
oligopolistic manner theoretically could attain the same level of 
supracompetitive pricing. Their ability to approach such a price 
23. F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 252. 
24. Landes & Posner, supra note 3. 
25. Id. at 947-50. This is not to imply that the firm's market share does not affect its ability 
to raise and maintain price above cost. The larger the firm's market share, the greater the 
percentage increase in market price for any given percentage reduction in its output. Simi-
larly, the smaller the market share of fringe competitors, the greater the percentage increase in 
output by fringe firms necessary to counteract the dominant firm's reduction in production. 
Consequently, it is easier and less costly for a firm with a large market share to command a 
supracompetitive price than for a firm with a small market share. Id. at 946-47. 
26. Id. at 951. One should recognize that, while such a price level may be possible, buyers 
would have such a strong incentive to switch and potential entrants such a great incentive to 
enter that market elasticities of demand and supply would probably increase rapidly. 
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level depends on the degree to which they can effectively enforce 
their agreement or understanding. 27 
The functional relationship between market share, market elas-
ticity of demand and supply elasticity of fringe competitors, and po-
tential entrants has enormously important implications for antitrust 
analysis and policy. Unless market elasticities of demand and sup-
ply become a key focus of analysis in antitrust litigation, the courts 
will run a substantial risk of seriously misapprehending the competi-
tive significance of the transaction or practices under review. Unfor-
tunately, as Landes and Posner readily acknowledge, direct estimates 
of either market demand or supply elasticity are seldom obtainable 
in a form capable of use in litigation.28 Consequently, analysts must 
devise indirect means of estimating these two elasticities. 
Generally speaking, consideration of the extent to which con-
sumers view different products as substitutes should provide a rea-
sonable, although approximate, indication of the market elasticity of 
demand. In fact, the courts traditionally employ this basic approach 
in defining the relevant product market. They essentially seek to de-
termine what other products are "reasonably interchangeable" for 
consumers and whether consumers will switch to or from such sub-
stitutes with modest relative changes in price.29 
What may be more difficult to estimate - and certainly provokes 
considerably greater controversy - is elasticity of supply of fringe 
competitors and potential entrants. Except in peculiar situations and 
special markets,30 it would appear that any attempt to estimate elas-
ticity of supply must consider factors that Bain and others have cate-
gorized as "barriers to entry." Indeed, if anything, the concept of 
supply elasticity may extend even further, theoretically encompass-
ing all factors that may affect the ability of fringe competitors to ex-
21. Id. at 951-52. 
28. Id. at 956, 979, 983. 
29. "The outer bounds of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchange-
ability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for 
it." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). 
At least in monopolization cases, cross-elasticity of demand cannot be rationally deter-
mined without some examination of the relationship between price and cost. That cross-elas-
ticity of demand may be high at the current market price would indicate that the alleged 
monopolist actually is exercising substantial market power if the price is materially above cost. 
On the other hand, the monopolist would have little market power if demand cross-elasticity 
were high at prices close to cost. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 14, f 16 at 55-58; Turner, Antitn1st 
Policy and the Cellophane Case, 10 HARV. L. R.Ev. 281, 302, 309 (1956). 
30. Direct measurement of supply elasticity may be possible, for example, where a govern-
ment price freeze is lifted or in agricultural markets with fluctuating price levels. In those 
situations, the amount of increased output could be directly correlated with the rise in price. 
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pand and potential entrants to enter promptly if the dominant firms 
reduce output in order to raise prices above a competitive level. De-
veloping even approximate estimates of supply elasticity requires 
consideration of the unit cost disadvantages faced by the fringe com-
petitors and potential entrants best situated to expand or enter, as 
well as the time required for them to do so.31 This inquiry consti-
tutes the essence of entry barrier analysis, or, in a slightly expanded 
form, the evaluation of mobility factors. 
B. Mobility Factors: Sources of Coefusion and Controversy 
That Posner and Landes, who are so closely aligned with the 
Chicago school of economics, should be emphasizing the importance 
of assessing "entry barriers" in structural antitrust cases serves to 
highlight the controversy and confusion that surround the role of 
mobility factors in antitrust analysis today. Posner, Bork, and their 
fellow Chicagoans have been the strongest advocates of limiting con-
sideration of "entry barriers" in antitrust analysis and litigation. 
And, to compound the irony, such distinguished representatives of 
the Harvard school as Areeda and Turner are espousing a similar 
view. 
If consideration of the conditions affecting entry and fringe ex-
pansion is so widely regarded as essential in assessing market power, 
why are such respected scholars now urging that the courts largely 
avoid inquiry into those conditions in antitrust litigation? To under-
stand why antitrust law is in this paradoxical situation, one must ap-
preciate the traditional legal view of entry barriers developed by the 
courts as well as the confusion engendered by the debate in the eco-
nomic community about what factors should be deemed "entry bar-
riers." In effect, the failure of the courts to understand the 
significance of mobility factors, compounded by the lack of a univer-
sally accepted economic framework for analyzing entry conditions, 
has resulted in a situation where, many believe, examination of mo-
bility factors in structural cases will only serve to confuse and com-
plicate already complex litigation. 
I. The Traditional Perspective of the Courts 
Despite the fact that economic theory accords great significance 
to elasticity of supply in assessing market power, the courts and the 
antitrust enforcement agencies have been slow to recognize its im-
portance. In the 1960's, the Supreme Court's major decisions in hor-
31. See text at notes 95-113 i'!fra. 
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izontal and vertical merger cases often completely ignored entry 
conditions, placing almost total reliance on market shares and con-
centration ratios even when ease of entry clearly limited the incum-
bent firms' market power. 32 Likewise, the merger guidelines 
developed by the Justice Department33 and the decisions of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission34 reflected the view that entry conditions 
were largely immaterial. 
Through the 1970's this perspective changed somewhat as the 
courts and enforcement agencies at least discussed, and evaluated 
evidence on, entry conditions. The courts and the FTC began to 
consider cross-elasticity of supply as well as cross-elasticity of de-
mand in determining the relevant market. 35 Vertical and horizontal 
merger cases that previously had been decided strictly on market 
shares began to take on potential competition dimensions. And, at 
least until 1974, the popularity of the potential competition theory 
itself prompted courts to consider more fully the ease or difficulty of 
entry. 
Despite some change in perspective, conditions affecting entry 
and fringe expansion have continued to be clearly subordinate fac-
tors in most structural cases. In all but a very few merger cases, en-
try barriers, if considered at all, have been discussed to buttress 
conclusions reached on the basis of other factors, primarily market 
shares and concentration ratios.36 The superficial and result-ori-
32. Obvious examples include the Supreme Court's landmark decisions in United States v. 
Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), and Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 
(1962). The majority's opinion in Von's lacked even a word about entry barriers despite Mr. 
Justice Stewart's remarks in the dissent chiding his brethren for ignoring the ease of entry into 
grocery retailing and the large number of prospective entrants. 384 U.S. at 300. Similarly, in 
Brown Shoe, Mr. Chief Justice Warren acknowledged the importance of entry conditions in 
merger analysis, 370 U.S. at 322, bu~ then-failed to examine the conditions affecting entry into 
shoe retailing. 
33. The Merger Guidelines promulgated by the Department of Justice in 1968 at least 
mentioned entry _barriers but, except for vertical mergers, the actual standards proposed relied 
heavily on market share and concentration data to the virtual exclusion of entry barriers, In-
deed, barriers to entry were not reflected at all in the standards applicable to horizontal merg-
ers. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 1 TRADE REG, REP. (CCH) ~ 4510. 
34. See, e.g., American Brake Shoe Co., 73 F.T.C. 610,684 (1968), eeforced, 420 F.2d 928 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970); Ekco Products Co., 65 F.T.C. 1163, 1206-09 (1964), 
a.ffd., 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965) (''where the merger's effects on competition are those pro-
scribed by Section 7, its illegality cannot be overcome by a showing of ease of entry."). 
35. Beginning in the mid-1970's, both the courts and the FTC "focused upon production 
flexibility as an important factor, generally .finding products to be in the same market or sub-
market where companies can readily switch their production capabilities from one product to 
another." ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 68 n.22a (3d Supp. 1981); see, e.g., Twin City Sportser-
vice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1975); Budd Co., 86 F.T.C. 518 
(1975). 
36. 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, ~ 917c at 88-89; Disner, Barrier Analysis in 
Antitrust Law, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 862, 889 (1973)(barrier analysis has been used "almost 
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ented nature of much of this barrier analysis is indicated by the vir-
tual unanimity among the decisions in finding the barriers to be 
"high."37 Until recently,38 the few notable exceptions were generally 
cases which did not require meaningful analysis because entry was 
clearly easy.39 Some potential competition merger decisions purport 
exclusively to buttress proof of violation."). Some of the more obvious examples where the 
courts and the FTC have stretched the available evidence concerning entry conditions to sup-
port a decision made on market shares include: United States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 440 F. 
Supp. 220 (E.D. Pa. 1976)(frozen dessert pie market); United States v. Blue Bell, Inc., 395 F. 
Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1975)(supply of industrial garments to unaffiliated rental laundries); 
Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 246, 274-75, 288-89 (1980)(although only small capital or 
promotional expenditures required and technology readily obtainable, lack of much recent 
entry combined with the large market shares and vertical integration of dominant firms indi-
cated that entry is not easy). See also Fruehauf Corp., 91 F.T.C. 132, 221 (1978), e'!forcement 
denied on other grounds, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979)(''no matter what the extent of barriers to 
entry into a highly concentrated industry, a merger between a major customer and a major 
supplier may restrain competition"). 
37. "Most of the cases mentioning entry barriers have characterized them as 'high' and 
then used that fact to buttress their condemnation of a merger." 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 
supra note 2, ~ 917c at 88-89, citing review of cases in id. at~ 909 a-b. 
38. A few recent decisions indicate an increased awareness of the importance of mobility 
factors in assessing the degree of market power and the competitive implications of a merger. 
In affirming the district court's preliminary injunction in Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., the 
Sixth Circuit, in fact, examined all the principal indicia of market power. It cited evidence 
indicating that market elasticity of demand was low (demand for gasoline had declined only 
moderately with ten-fold increase in price), that barriers to entry into petroleum refining were 
"high" ($1 billion required to build refinery with substantial additional investment and risk 
involved in exploration), and that major firms in a geographical region often had some appar-
ent power over price (persistent variations in price among various regions of the country). 
Most notable is the fact that the court gave much less apparent weight to concentration ratios 
than is typical, emphasizing the great market power attributable to low elasticities of market 
demand and supply as well as the opportunity for collusion arising from the many joint ar-
rangements and operations in the oil industry. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378 
(6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3670 (1982). 
Six months previously, a federal district court had denied the FTC's request to enjoip a 
horizontal merger, resting the denial principally on an analysis of mobility factors. FTC v. 
Great Lakes Chemical Corp., 528 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Ill. 1981). The FTC had claimed that the 
merger would lessen competition in two markets: brominated flame retardant and elemental 
bromine. In the flame retardant market, the court found that outside firms could enter easily 
with no cost disadvantage. Indeed, one had entered with a $50,000 capital investment, several 
other firms had entered in the previous 5 years and, with the added capacity, prices had 
dropped substantially. In the elemental bromine market, the court found that the incumbent 
firms had no power to raise price above cost even though there were only five domestic produ-
cers (reduced to four by the merger). Having lost two of the principal markets for bromine, the 
industry had tremendous excess capacity which was projected to continue until the year 2000. 
Moreover, several other identified firms had access to the natural resources and technology 
required to enter and had not done so because of the low return on investment. See also The 
Pillsbury Co., 93 F.T.C. 966, 1039-40 (1979)(where market shares fell "in the gray area at the 
edge of potential illegality under the Department of Justice guidelines," merger was permitted 
because barriers to entry were "moderate to low"). 
39. See United States v. Healthco, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 258, 272-73 (S.D.N.Y.), affd. mem., 
535 F.2d 1243 (2d Cir. 1975)(dental sundries market where mail order firms could enter eas-
ily); United States v. Crowell, Collier and MacMillan, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 
1973)(band uniforms); Beatrice Foods Co. (Sexton), 81 F.T.C. 517 (1972)(institutional grocery 
distributor market); United States v. Tidewater Marine Service, 284 F. Supp. 324, 339 (E.D. 
La. 1968) (supply and utility boat chartering). Cf. United States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. 
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to conduct an extensive barrier analysis. But, even in those cases, the 
assessment of entry conditions has tended to reflect less an apprecia-
tion of the real competitive significance of entry barriers than an at-
tempt to satisfy the Supreme Court's ill-conceived standards which 
themselves are based on fundamental misconceptions about the 
competitive significance of supply elasticity.40 
Hopefully, the increased emphasis on entry conditions in some 
recent cases41 and, particularly, in the new Justice Department and 
FTC Merger Guidelines42 heralds a shift in the importance accorded 
entry barriers in structural antitrust cases. Meaningful analysis of 
entry conditions in litigation, however, will not occur unless the 
courts and antitrust enforcement agencies recognize the basic reason 
for considering entry barriers and attempt to develop an economi-
cally sound approach for evaluating their competitive significance. 
Past decisions reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the real 
objective of barrier analysis: to determine the degree to which domi-
nant incumbents can restrict output and thereby raise prices without 
inducing new entry. The mistaken notion that every step a new en-
trant must take to enter a market amounts fo a substantial entry bar-
rier pervades many court and FTC opinions.43 As a consequence, 
the decisions - while often purporting to apply Bain's basic meth-
odology for assessing entry barriers - actually have distorted it into 
Supp. 1093 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (motion picture production); United States v. Consolidated Foods 
Corp., 455 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (frozen dessert pies). 
40. Any competitive injury resulting from the removal of a potential entrant is due simply 
to a reduction in elasticity of supply. Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 972. That is, incum-
bents have greater freedom to raise price above cost without prompting entry. Unfortunately, 
what should be a relatively limited and straightforward analysis of entry barriers has become 
increasingly complicated since the Supreme Court's enunciation of a series of arbitrary stan-
dards in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974). See notes 77-86 
iefra and accompanying text. 
41. See note 38 supra. 
42. In contrast to the 1968 Merger Guidelines, the new Merger Guidelines of the Depart• 
ment of Justice and the FTC evidence a recognition of the importance of entry conditions in 
assessing market power. Both agencies indicate that, where entry into a market is easy, they 
are ''unlikely to challenge mergers in that market" but "where entry is unusually difficult" they 
are "more likely" to bring suit. U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines 21-22 (June 14, 
1982) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review); Statement of Federal Trade Commission 
Concerning Horizontal Mergers 5 (June 15, 1982) (copy on file with the Michigan Law 
Review). 
43. For example, in United States v. Phillipsburg Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 
368 (1970), the Supreme Court cited New Jersey banking regulations as a significant entry 
barrier when, as the lower court found, a small group of businessmen could raise sufficient 
capital and readily obtain regulatory approval to start a bank. See United States v. Phillips• 
burg Natl Bank & Trust Co., 306 F. Supp. 645, 659 (D.N.J. 1969), revd., 399 U.S. 350 (1970). 
Similarly, in Stanley Works, the FTC found a significant entry barrier because $600,000 
would be necessary for suppliers of other hardware products to expand into the cabinent hard-
ware market. The fact that $50-60,000 was required to promote a new product line and 
$70,000 was spent annually by Stanley on hardware promotions was also considered a mean• 
ingful impediment to entry. The Stanley Works, 78 F.T.C. 1023, 1065-66 (1971), qffd., 469 
F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973). 
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a "laundry list" approach to barrier analysis. The number of hurdles 
a new entrant must overcome and the amount of money it must 
spend have become important in the abstract, even though the al-
leged impediments and costs may have little impact on the incum-
bents' pricing flexibility and, indeed, may have no effect at all on the 
firms best situated to enter.44 
The courts and the FTC have repeatedly found barriers to be 
"high" when entry for a totally new business entity would require 
the investment of a few million (sometimes a few hundred thousand) 
dollars in plant and equipment, where some economies of scale ex-
isted or some modest advertising was necessary.45 In many cases, the 
barrier - even if substantial for a new business entity - would 
probably be inconsequential for the most obvious potential en-
trants.46 Notably, except for potential competition cases, most deci-
sions totally fail to determine whether the capital requirements or 
other factors identified as barriers would have any effect at all on the 
potential entrants in the best position to enter, as opposed to a newly 
created firm.47 Virtually nowhere have the courts or the FTC en-
deavored to estimate - even roughly - the extent to which such 
barriers permit dominant incumbents to hold price above a competi-
tive level.48 
Yet, the very objective of Bain's analytical approach is to deter-
mine the degree of the major incumbents' pricing fl.exibility.49 Ab-
sent some indication of how a particular entry barrier affects the 
most advantaged potential entrants and fringe competitors, and how 
much it enables major incumbents to deviate from competitive be-
havior, examination of entry barriers is of very limited value. 
44. The "laundry list" approach creates obvious incentives for litigants to devote a sub-
stantial amount of the trial to developing a superficial evidentiary record concerning a broad 
range of possible "entry barriers" rather than building the record necessary for the court to 
evaluate the competitive significance of the barriers that really may be important. 
45. See Disner, supra note 36, at 884-900. 
46. See, e.g., Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1979)(although the 
court found $10-20 million to be a substantial entry barrier, it recognized that the major pur-
chasers of heavy wheels would enter themselves or finance entry by others were they all dissat-
isfied with existing competition); cases cited in note 36 supra. 
47. The competitive significance of disadvantages facing fringe competitors - as opposed 
to new entrants - has almost never been considered by the courts or the FTC although fringe 
incumbents may be more important in limiting the dominant firms' market power. Two po-
tential competition merger cases, however, have analyzed a small incumbent as a potential 
entrant. Heublein, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 385, 583-92 (1980); The Bendix Corp., 77 F.T.C. 731, 809 
(1970), revd and remanded on other grounds, 450 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1971). 
48. But see E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 707 (1980)(duPont's ilemnite 
chloride process enabled it to produce titanium dioxide at 16 cents/lb. compared to its compet-
itors' cost of 21 cents/lb.). 
49. J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 3, 170-71 (1956). 
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2. The Economic .Debate 
The confusion about the concept of "entry barriers" arising from 
the courts' misconceptions was compounded further as the result of 
the vigorous debate in the late 1960's and 1970's over proposals to 
break large corporations in concentrated markets into smaller 
units.50 Those associating themselves with the Harvard school of ec-
onomics contended that the numerous studies finding a high correla-
tion between concentration and profitability demonstrated that the 
leading firms in very concentrated markets were engaging in con-
scious parallelism which enabled them to earn supracompetitive 
pro.fits. To remedy the perceived welfare loss, many aligned with the 
Harvard school advocated a policy of deconcentration. Those op-
posing deconcentration, however, asked how high rates of return 
could persist without attracting new entrants who would increase 
output and thereby force prices and pro.fits downward. 
The answer of ~e Harvard school - that "barriers to entry" 
such as those identified by Bain inhibited the erosion of dominant 
incumbents' market power in a large number of highly concentrated 
markets - provoked a vigorous and often polemical response by 
leading Chicagoans. Most of the alleged "entry barriers" relied on 
by those advocat~g deconcentration, they argued, reflected either 
the nature of the task to be performed or the greater efficiency of the 
dominant firms. For example, while economies of scale and large 
capital requirements - two categories of entry barriers cited by Bain 
- impeded new entry, interfering with the market structure to re-
duce those "barriers" would merely sacrifice economic performance 
to gain ease of entry.51 Similarly, the Chicago school contended that 
physical product differentiation and advertising lead to market 
power only when sellers successfully respond to consumer demand. 
Since offering products that people want more is as much a form of 
efficiency as cutting costs ( even if the products demanded are more 
expensive than others), supracompetitive pro.fits based on product 
differentiation and advertising likewise do not warrant government 
intervention or divestiture. 52 
50. See Posner, supra note 15, at 944-48 (capsulizing the debate) and INDUSTRIAL CON-
CENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974)(for an 
expanded view) (hereinafter cited as INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION). 
51. See R. BORK, supra note 7, at 195-96, 311, 320-24; R. POSNER, supra note 2 at 92; 
McGee, Efficiency and Economies of Scale in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra note 50 at 
55; Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra 
note 50 at 173. 
52. R. BoRK, supra note 7, at 312-20; Brozen, Ent,y Barriers: Advertising and Product .D!f-
ftrentiation in INDUSTRIAL CoNCENTR;\TION, supra note 50. 
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The controversy over "entry barriers" has certainly been benefi-
cial in exposing certain weaknesses in Bain's approach and in high-
lighting many of the misconceptions of the courts.53 Indeed, while 
the Harvard school still continues to defend a more expansive view 
of entry barriers than do most Chicagoans, some scholars who for-
merly subscribed to Bain's views such as Areeda and Turner have 
modified their approaches to scale economies, product differentia-
tion and capital requirements.54 Unfortunately, the debate has mag-
nified the degree of actual difference among economists about the 
concept of "entry barriers" and has probably thereby served to con-
fuse courts and litigants in antitrust cases even more. Consequently, 
there is an understandable appeal for the proposals advanced by 
prominent Chicagoans and now Areeda and Turner that courts 
should avoid inquiry into "entry barriers" or mobility factors since 
such analyses would mire litigation in a factual and theoretical mo-
rass55 and might lead to attacks on efficiencies in the name of 
competition. 56 
Such proposals, however, would have perverse effects, which the 
very commentators who champion them implicitly recognize. The 
Chicagoans who suggest that the courts should not consider entry 
barriers also criticize the courts for failing to take entry conditions 
into account.57 Likewise, Areeda and Turner propose to preclude 
consideration of entry conditions in horizontal merger cases but are 
forced to acknowledge that some examination of them is indispensa-
ble to the rational application of the antitrust laws in structural 
cases.58 Indeed, both schools agree that mobility factors are an ana-
53. In particular, the Chicagoans attacked the co=on misconception that "barriers to 
entry" should be interpreted literally to apply to anything a new entrant must overcome to 
gain a foothold in a market. See R. BORK,supra note 7 at 310-11; R. PosNER,supra note 2, at 
59. They have also emphasized the need for courts to recognize that some "entry barriers" are 
forms of efficiency. See R. BoRK, supra note 7, at 195-96, 311. 
54. See Posner, supra note 15, at 946-48, in which Posner compares the discussion of entry 
barriers in C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY (1959) with the discussion in 2 P. 
AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 2, ~~ 408-09. 
55. See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, ~ 1015c, at 271. 
56. See R. BORK, supra note 7, at 311 (if care is not taken to "distinguish between forms of 
efficiency and artificial barriers . . . the law will find itself - indeed, it has found itself -
attacking efficiency in the name of market freedom."). 
57. R. BoRK, supra note 7, at 212 (Brown Shoe decision erroneous because vertical integra-
tion could have no anticompetitive effect "given the ease and rapidity of entry into shoe retail-
ing"); R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 106 ("most glaring deficiency in the government's case Iin 
Von'.!'] was the fact that it ignored the ease and rapidity of entry into the retail grocery 
business"). 
58. See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, ~ 1015c, at 271 (entry conditions relevant 
to horizontal mergers and a "critical" consideration in vertical merger cases). 
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lytical key to the evaluation of market power.59 Some agreement 
also now seems to exist that the courts should ignore this key. This 
paradox suggests the urgent need to develop a new framework for 
mobility factor analysis, an approach sophisticated enough to define 
the contours of market power yet practical enough for use in actual 
litigation. 
C. Common Ground· The Foundation of a New Approach 
The rhetoric in the debate between representatives of the Chi-
cago and Harvard schools has tended to obscure the many points of 
fundamental agreement concerning mobility factors. To begin to 
dispel some of the clouds of confusion that surround the entire topic, 
it is important to recognize several basic points about which little, if 
any, disagreement seems to exist. 
First, the fact that a new entrant must invest some time and 
money to develop the product, enter into production, and distribute 
its product does not necessarily mean that incumbents ( even a mo-
nopolist) in the market have any power to maintain price above a 
competitive level for any meaningful period oftime.60 Both the Chi-
cago and Harvard schools of thought recognize that incumbents will 
have no flexibility to charge supracompetitive prices unless fringe 
competitors and potential entrants have a significant unit cost or risk 
disadvantage or cannot expand or enter quickly. 
Second, stressing the importance of conditions that disadvantage 
fringe competitors and new entrants - whether termed "mobility 
factors," "conditions of entry," "barriers to entry," or "conditions 
affecting supply elasticity" - should not imply that such conditions 
themselves are necessarily bad or anticompetitive. Economies of 
scale, for example, may impose a substantial unit cost disadvantage 
on a new entrant or small rival but such economies are not undesir-
able. 61 Indeed, by enabling goods to be produced at lower costs, 
they increase economic efficiency and generally lower prices for 
59. The entire Chicago approach to analysis focuses on ascertaining why fringe expansion 
and new entry do not quickly erode any market power that may arise. See, e.g., R. BORK, 
supra note 7, at 195; Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, supra note 20, at 166; 
Posner, supra note 15, at 945. The Harvard approach likewise considers conditions limiting 
entry and fringe expansion to be a basic determinant of market power. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, 
supra note 3, at 232-52; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 14, at § 23. 
60. These steps are required of any new entrant into a manufacturing industry. Yet, there 
is no indication that major firms in all (or even most) manufacturing industries have any mate-
rial degree of market power. 
61. As Stigler has observed, one could equally say that the real problem is inadequate 
demand, which clearly is not anticompetitive. G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 
67 (1968). 
August 1982] Mobility Factors 1563 
consumers. 62 
Third, the fact that many "mobility factors" arise from or create 
efficiencies - in the form of lower production costs, greater con-
sumer choice, better quality, or improved product development, for 
example - does not mean they may not be an important considera-
tion in antitrust analysis. To the extent any mobility factor permits 
only a few dominant incumbents to have meaningful output and 
pricing flexibility, courts and analysts should consider it in assessing 
any transaction or practice that increases concentration or precludes 
other firms from realizing efficiencies. To do otherwise runs a sub-
stantial risk that the dominant firms will not pass on the benefits of 
greater efficiency to consumers because of overt or tacit collusion. 
Fourth, courts and enforcement agencies must carefully guard 
against reducing the consumer welfare benefits of efficiencies by 
their actions and remedies. Certainly, if a court views all "entry bar-
riers" as evil, the logic~l next step for the unsophisticated tribunal is 
to attempt to eliminate the perceived "barriers" - notwithstanding 
any undesirable effects on consumer_welfare. Attempting to prevent 
such an occurrence by removing assessment of mobility factors as an 
essential part of antitrust analysis as Bork suggests, however, offers 
at best a perverse solution to this problem. The better approach 
would be to assist the courts and antitrust agencies in understanding 
mobility factors, their competitive significance, and their efficiency 
implications. Two examples may illustrate the importance and im-
plications of these basic points. Consider a market with low elastic-
ity of demand and high concentration. Assume that very few firms in 
the market have the market share ( or access to the equipment or 
other necessary input) required to realize economies of scale. As-
sume also that a firm unable to attain minimum efficient size oper-
ates at a substantial unit cost disadvantage. In this situation, a 
merger between two of the firms that have achieved efficient scale 
(the "advantaged" firms) is likely to increase the potential for 
supracompetitive pricing with little prospect of any efficiency gain. 
For similar reasons, one would also be concerned about a merger 
between one of the dominant firms and the only "disadvantaged" 
competitor capable of promptly achieving an efficient level of opera-
62. Admittedly, economies of scale may greatly compound the effects of exclusionary ac-
tions. For example, limitations on the number of gates an airline can obtain at an airport may 
keep it from achieving network economies, see note 164 i'!fra, or actions precluding a competi-
tor from obtaining high-volume machinery may deny it the opportunity of producing at lowest 
attainable costs. CJ. Grand Caillou Packing Co., 65 F.T.C. 799 (1964), q/fd sub nom. LaPeyre 
v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966). But the anticompetitive problem stems from the denial 
of access, not from economies of scale itself. 
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tions.63 On the other hand, a merger between two disadvantaged 
competitors in order to realize economies of scale should both in-
crease consumer welfare (by lowering their costs) and reduce the po-
tential for collusion (by increasing the number of firms operating at 
minim.um attainable costs). 
In monopolization cases also, these four basic points are impor-
tant to keep in mind even when the monopolist clearly enjoys market 
power. In determining what, if any, intervention is appropriate, the 
key issues should be (1) whether the alleged monopolist's actions 
have impaired other firms' ability to overcome any significant cost or 
other disadvantage, and (2) whether such actions were necessary to 
achieve or maintain efficiencies such as obtaining low costs, meeting 
current or anticipated demand or providing better quality.64 If the 
firm has done no more than that reasonably required to realize effi-
ciencies and consumer benefits, it has done nothing detrimental to 
consumer welfare, and a finding of liability would have perverse re-
sults. If, in contrast, the firm has taken actions beyond those neces-
sary to realize efficiencies, the fact that the alleged monopolist's 
market power rests in part on factors that create or result from effi-
ciencies should not automatically end the inquiry. Rather, the en-
forcement agencies and the courts should examine the firm's actions 
that were not reasonably necessary to maintain efficiencies to deter-
63. The merger would reduce the "elasticity of supply of fringe firms," permitting the 
dominant firms to maintain price above cost for a longer period without ipducing expansion 
by fringe competitors. It would also remove the prospect that, with the addition of another 
competitor in a position to determine market price, the potential for collusion would decrease. 
64. The standards developed by the courts for determining whether a firm's conduct justi-
fies a finding of monopolization are fraught with verbal formulations which provide little gui-
dance to courts, litigants, or businessmen. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 
563, 570-71 (1966)(market power illegal only when there is a ''willful acquisition or mainte-
nance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a supe-
rior product, business acumen, or historic accident."); United States v. United Shoe Machinery 
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 at 341 (D. Mass. 1953), q(fd.per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954)(Judge 
Wyzanski found that monopolization can occur ''where the causes of an enterprise's success 
were neither common law restraints of trade, nor the skill with which the business was con-
ducted, but rather some practice which without being predatory, abusive or coercive was in 
economic effect exclusionary."); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d •I 15, 431 (2d 
Cir. 1945)(monopolistic exclusion not limited to "maneuvers not honestly industrial" or "acti-
vated solely by a desire to prevent competition."); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 14, §§ 33-39. 
Most of these formulations attempt to distinguish conduct that is harmful in an economic 
sense from aggressive competitive actions which are not. Both types of conduct can disadvan-
tage competitors and thereby lead to substantial market power. By phrasing the issue in terms 
of whether the allegedly monopolistic actions were necessary to achieve efficiencies, the real 
objective of the inquiry becomes clearer (even though the term "efficiencies" is necessarily 
somewhat vague). Where apparent efficiencies are involved, determining whether less an-
ticompetitive means were reasonably available to obtain those efficiencies dispenses with the 
need to determine the state of mind of the alleged monopolist's management as Bork appar-
ently would require. See note 7 supra. 
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mine the extent to which they hinder other firms in eroding the mo-
nopolist's market power. 
Thus, in the monopoly as in the merger example, neither the fact 
that the firm or firms have ( or would gain) market power nor the fact 
that some efficiencies are involved should be determinative. Either 
extreme approach would risk substantial sacrifices of consumer wel-
fare. Instead, the courts should scrutinize the exclusionary practices 
(or mergers) to ascertain whether they have restrained, or will likely 
lessen, competition and, if so, whether they are necessary to achieve 
or maintain sign!ficant efficiencies. 65 
The determination of whether judicial action may impair effi-
ciency almost invariably requires identification and examination of 
the significant mobility factors involved.66 So does ascertaining the 
degree of market power and designing an appropriate remedy in mo-
nopolization cases. Liberalized market share standards for mergers 
and the use of reasonable presumptions may obviate the need to ex-
amine mobility factors directly in certain merger cases. They cannot 
remove the need for such examination in all situations, however, 
without substantial risk of harming consumer welfare either because 
of governmental and judicial action or inaction.67 Consequently, an 
65. Efficiencies that are material almost surely have been recognized by the firms in an 
industry either in the manner in which they organize or conduct their operations or, in the case 
of disadvantaged competitors, as a cause of their disadvantage. Thus, claims may be made that 
many things create efficiencies. But, if the existing competitors have not concentrated their 
efforts on achieving or maintaining a purported efficiency, it almost certainly can be disre-
garded as insignificant without attempting to quantify the efficiency effect. Cf. R. BORK, supra 
note 7, at 126-29 (arguing that no adequate method exists to quantify many important ele-
ments of efficiency). 
66. Landes and Posner suggest a test for distinguishing between mergers that predomi-
nantly increase efficiencies and those that primarily increase market power. When efficiencies 
dominate, the market share of the merged firm will become larger than the aggregate shares of 
the acquiring and acquired firms. When the merger principally increases market power, the 
merged entity's market share will be smaller. Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 973. Such a 
measure is of doubtful utility because of the obvious incentive for the merging parties to at-
tempt in any way possible to increase market share during the litigation such as by deliberately 
maintaining low prices until the merger case is decided. Id 
67. As noted by Landes and Posner, market share and concentration are not always relia-
ble indicia of market power. Likewise, even firms with significant market shares may face an 
efficiency disadvantage vis-a-vis dominant firms in the market. 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 
supra note 2, ~ 940, at 148 n.l. Thus, merely liberalizing market share standards for mergers 
does not automatically avoid the need to examine mobility factors. 
This is not to imply, however, that mobility factors must be directly assessed in all merger 
cases. An inquiry into mobility factors would be unnecessary where the merging firms' market 
shares (and, in potential competition cases, the market concentration) were so low that compe-
tition is unlikely to be lessened even if major incumbents had a considerable cost advantage. 
Moreover, data on profitability and recent entry may sometimes provide a sufficiently clear 
indication of market power that evidence pertaining to specific mobility factors would be un-
necessary to establish (or rebut) aprimafacie case. For example, evidence of persistently high 
profits with no significant entry for several years would be a strong indication of substantial 
market power while modest profits and considerable recent entry would show the opposite. 
See text at notes 73-74 irifra. 
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economically sound approach to determining the competitive signifi-
cance of mobility factors must be developed to assist the courts in 
this undertaking. 
This Article advances the thesis that, by focusing on the principal 
determinants of market power in structural cases and on the basic 
objectives of mobility factor analysis, meaningful examination of 
mobility factors can be integrated into antitrust cases without in-
creasing their complexity. As described in the second Part of the 
Article, the proposed approach requires that courts and litigants, 
first, recognize the issues likely to be determinative in various types 
of structural cases and, second, concentrate their examination of mo-
bility factors on determining how, how much, and how long they per-
mit supracompetitive pricing. Not only does the proposal provide an 
economically sound approach to assessing the competitive implica-
tions of mobility factors but, as discussed in the final Part of the 
Article, it can actually assist courts in simplifying and managing 
complex litigation. 
II. A PROPOSED APPROACH FOR ANALYZING MOBILITY FACTORS 
IN STRUCTURAL CASES 
The misconceptions and confusion embodied in the traditional 
approach to "entry barriers" in antitrust law have distorted both the 
legal standards applicable to structural cases and the analysis of en-
try barriers itself. Consequently, developing a practical approach for 
integrating sound mobility factor analysis into antitrust litigation ne-
cessitates a re-examination of the prevailing legal principles as well 
as the construction of a framework for assisting courts in evaluating 
the competitive significance of mobility factors. In this Part, I dis-
cuss first the basic legal standards in structural antitrust cases from 
an economic perspective. Such an examination demonstrates that, at 
least in those cases likely to be litigated, the determinative issues -
those concerning market power and efficiency - often relate primar-
ily, if not exclusively, to mobility factors. Therefore, identifying 
those cases where issues involving mobility factors are likely to be 
dispositive and focusing the litigation on the important mobility fac-
tor or factors from the outset should facilitate more rational deci-
sion-making and more streamlined litigation. 
To assist the courts and litigants in assessing the significant com-
petitive effects of individual mobility factors, I also propose in this 
Part an analytical framework which concentrates on determining the 
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extent to which a particular mobility factor allows dominant incum-
bents to maintain price above a competitive level. Under this frame-
work, the initial analytical step is to determine how, if at all, a 
purported mobility factor enables dominant incumbents to maintain 
price above cost without prompting fringe competitors to expand or 
new firms to enter. Current economic commentary suggests that mo-
bility factors are only competitively significant where they place 
fringe rivals or potential entrants at a disadvantage vis-a-vis major 
incumbents in terms of unit cost, risk, or time lag. Where a mobility 
factor has one or more of these three effects, the degree of pricing 
flexibility attributable to it can then be evaluated by roughly estima-
ting how much the dominant firms can maintain price above cost and 
for how long. Since this largely depends on how the mobility factor 
affects the potential entrants most capable of entry and the small 
competitors best situated to expand, the extent of the disadvantage 
(if any) those firms face determines the major incumbents' degree of 
market power. 
A. Re-examining the Role of Mobility Factors in Structural Cases 
Considering the legal standards applicable to the principal types 
of structural antitrust cases in light of the objectives of antitrust en-
forcement and economic theory demonstrates that meaningful con-
sideration of mobility factors is often essential to rational application 
of the antitrust laws. Certainly, in monopolization and vertical and 
potential competition merger cases, the determinative issues pertain 
almost totally to the competitive and efficiency implications of mo-
bility factors. Even in horizontal merger cases, consideration of the 
significant factors affecting fringe expansion and new entry would 
add an important new dimension and, in many cases, would pro-
mote better understanding of the potential for oligopolistic coordina-
tion and of the impact of government intervention on efficiency. 
I. Monopolization Cases 
A monopolization case presents two basic issues. First, the 
defendant firm must be found to have monopoly power, "the power 
to control price or to exclude competition."68 Second, it must usu-
ally be shown that the monopolist has obtained or maintained mo-
nopoly power through exclusionary actions that, while possibly 
"honestly industrial" were not "economically inevitable."69 
68. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966), citing United States v. 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 381 (1956). 
69. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (D. Mass. 1953), 
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Whatever the alleged monopolist's market share, significant power 
over price cannot exist unless purchasers will not switch to substi-
tutes until prices rise substantially above a competitive level and 
competitors (actual and potential) have a substantial cost or other 
disadvantage vis-a-vis the monopolist. Likewise, the power to ex-
clude requires that the alleged monopolist either have effective con-
trol over a factor necessary for others to overcome their disadvantage 
or can engage in practices that limit their ability to do so. Whether 
the defendant firm has obtained or maintained its monopoly power 
other than by. greater efficiency requires a determination of whether 
the exclusionary practices the defendant has engaged in really create 
or heighten competitors' disadvantage and, if so, whether they were 
necessary to achieve or maintain its efficiency.70 
Assuming a relatively low market elasticity of demand at a com-
petitive price level, the entire focus of monopolization cases will nec-
essarily relate to conditions affecting entry and expansion. What are 
the primary mobility factors? How do they affect firms in the best 
position to expand or enter? To what extent do they enable the mo-
nopolist to maintain price above cost? What actions has the alleged 
monopolist taken to increase the disadvantage or time lag that 
smaller competitors and potential entrants face? And, were its ac-
tions necessary to maintain or improve the efficiency of its 
operation? 
2. Vertical Merger Cases 
Mobility factors are also the essential determinant of the prospect 
that a vertical merger may lessen competition substantially. A verti-
cal merger cannot reduce competition in any market significantly 
unless actual and potential competitors in either the buyer's or 
seller's market face substantial disadvantages.71 To be sure, a 
qffd. per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 
431 (2d Cir. 1945). 
70. See text accompanying note 64 supra. A number of recent decisions recognize the 
importance of ascertaining the efficiency implications of allegedly exclusionary practices and 
of considering less restrictive means of attaining these efficiencies. The FTC found du Font's 
capacity expansion and related actions to be reasonable, although they effectively precluded 
expansion by competitors, because du Font's increased capacity was no more than that neces-
sary to achieve economies of scale and to meet predicted demand. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & 
Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 746-51 (1980). In denying AT&T's motion to dismiss, Judge Greene 
stressed the need to determine whether its exclusionary actions were required to maintain the 
efficiency of AT&T's telephone network. United States v. American TeL & Tel. Co., 524 F. 
Supp. 1336, 1350-51 (D.D.C. 1980). See also Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp., 559 
F.2d 488, 498 (9th Cir. 1977) (whether practices ''unnecessarily excluded competition"); 
Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979). 
71. "Without substantial market power at any one production or distribution stage, verti-
cal integration lacks antitrust significance." 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, Sllpra note 2, ~ 724, at 
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merger will run only a remote risk of significantly lessening competi-
tion unless market concentration is high and both firms have a sig-
nifi.cant share of their respective markets - Areeda and Turner 
suggest 15 percent.72 Above those thresholds, however, courts and 
e¢'orcement agencies cannot responsibly decide vertical merger 
cases without at least considering mobility factors in a meaningful 
way. 
To avoid actual analysis of entry conditions, Areeda and Turner 
suggest that decision-makers assume the existence of high entry bar-
riers when no substantial successful new entry has occurred for a 
period of time, unless the market was declining. They would not 
permit either party to demonstrate that barriers were, in fact, high 
despite new entry or that they were actually low despite the absence 
of entry. This raises a serious problem, as they reluctantly concede. 
Absence of entry may be "due simply to the fact that existing firms 
have been highly efficient and have priced competitively" while en-
try may be from "a relatively high-cost firm attracted by monopoly 
pricing."73 Thus, at least without consideration of the incumbents' 
profitability to determine their price-cost margins, the extent of past 
entry is an extremely unreliable indicator of the height of entry 
barriers. 74 
The Areeda and Turner effort to avoid considering mobility fac-
tors becomes totally nonsensical in situations where some market 
power may appear to exist, as indicated by lack of entry alone or, 
more rationally, in conjunction with data showing high profits. 
Without examining mobility factors, it is difficult for the decision-
maker to determine whether the merger may increase that market 
power. He cannot ascertain if entry and expansion will probably be 
195. Indeed, Areeda and Turner suggest a vertical merger should be deemed presumptively 
illegal only where both buyer and seller markets are highly concentrated and have substantial 
barriers to entry. 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, f 1015a. 
72. 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, f 1015a, d. 
73. Id., f 1015c, at 272. 
74. Economic theory indicates that, depending on how the dominant firms discount.future 
profits, the magnitude of their cost advantage, and the number of potential entrants capable of 
entry with comparable unit costs, the major incumbents may pursue one of a number of differ-
ent pricing strategies. These range from pricing at a level that will prompt substantial immedi-
ate entry to pricing at a level that will deter all entry, with numerous possible variations in 
between. See F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 232-52; Gaskins, Dynamic Limit Pricing: Optimal 
Pricing Under Threat of Entry, 3 J. EcoN. THEORY 306 (1971). 
Other than by examining mobility factors, the only way of ascertaining the price level vis-
a-vis the dominant firms' costs is to examine their profitability. Compare FTC v. Great Lakes 
Chemical Corp., 528 F. Supp. 84, 94 (N.D. Ill. 198l)(absence of entry explained by incum-
bents' low return on investment) with FTC v. Rhinechem Corp., 459 F. Supp. 785, 789-80 
(N.D. Ill. 1978)(no successful de novo entry in 20 years considered strong evidence of high 
barriers to entry without examining profitability). \ 
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more difficult, particularly for the most advantaged potential en-
trants and fringe competitors. He likewise cannot judge whether 
concentration is likely to increase, or whether buyers and sellers in 
the market will simply realign relationships.75 Moreover, if the de-
fendant claims that the vertical merger will increase efficiencies, 
Areeda and Turner would have the court assess the pertinent mobil-
ity factors in any event.76 
3. Potential Competition Cases 
From any rational economic perspective, the inquiry in potential 
competition cases should focus almost exclusively on mobility fac-
tors. The elimination of a potential entrant will permit greater pric-
ing and output flexibility (i.e., market power) for the firms in the 
market only if the potential entrant removed by merger is one of a 
very few firms77 with a material advantage over other potential en-
trants. An "advantaged" potential entrant may, for example, be able 
to enter with lower unit costs or at less risk than most other possible 
entrants or it may be able to establish itself in the market sooner. In 
such situations, the removal of an "advantaged" potential entrant 
would enable incumbents in the market to raise prices further above 
a competitive level for a longer period of time without prompting 
75. In fact, the Second Circuit's decision jp Fruehaef, which Areeda and Turner praise, 
would have been decided the other way under their suggested approach to vertical mergers. 
See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, f 1022c discussing Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC., 603 
F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 19:79). 
In Fruehaef, the Second Circuit found concentration to be high and entry barriers signifi-
cant. But, it held that the merger was not likely to lessen competition because there was no 
evidence that the merger would increase existing barriers to entry or levels of concentration. 
603 F.2d at 359. Specifically, the court found no reason to believe that the merger would 
adversely affect economies of scale or compel new entrants to enter on a vertically integrated 
basis. Moreover, the merger was not likely to affect concentration because major producers 
and purchasers could simply realign"their sales and purchasing patterns. 603 F.2d at 359. 
The new Department of Justice Merger Guidelines support the view that the pertinent 
mobility factors must be analyzed at least in situations where the vertical merger allegedly 
increases barriers to entry. The Guidelines note that difficulties of entry may be increased 
considerably, thereby lessening competition, in situations where a new entrant into one market 
must, as a result of the merger, enter the other market simultaneously. Material increases to 
entry barriers can occur in such situations as a result of the extent of the capital investment 
that must be put at risk (and the degree of risk) or the economies of scale in the two markets. 
U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines 34-47 (June 14, 1982)(copy on file with the 
Michigan Law Review). 
76. 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, f 1016. 
77. The fewer potential entrants with a material advantage over other potential entrants, 
the more important it is to retain each of them. Relying on a single "advantaged" potential 
entrant to discipline competition in the market runs the risk that the firm will be devoting its 
resources to other profit opportunities at the very time that incumbents in the target market 
attempt to raise prices above a competitive level. Indeed, the incumbents may perceive the 
opportunity for greater pricing flexbility if the obvious potential entrant is focusing its efforts 
elsewhere. For this reason, one should be concerned when there are three or fewer potential 
entrants. See 5 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, f 1123. 
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entry. The removal of a potential entrant - to the extent it has any 
competitive significance at all - therefore amounts to raising the 
"barriers to entry" (or as Landes and Posner say, altering the elastic-
ity of supply78) in the market. 
Logically, then, analysis in potential competition cases should fo-
cus on the conditions affecting entry, how those conditions differen-
tially affect the firms most capable of entry and, perhaps, the 
conditions affecting the ability of fringe incumbents to expand out-
put.79 The only relevant issue that does not relate to mobility factors 
is the degree of concentration in the market, an essential considera-
tion because actual rather than potential competition should impose 
the principal disciplining force in an unconcentrated market. Unfor-
tunately, the Supreme Court has grafted onto an inquiry that should 
be almost exclusively structural in nature a required analysis of be-
havioral considerations. 80 By doing so, the Court has diverted the 
focus of litigation from the essential issues.81 
78. Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 972. 
79. It is likely that the ability of fringe competitors to expand will often provide a greater 
and more immediate check on the dominant incumbents' pricing flexibility than will the abil-
ity of potential entrants to enter. 
80. In United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 624-25, 633, 639 (1974),'the 
Supreme Court identified the following elements as necessary to establish a Section 7 violation 
in a potential competition case: (1) the target market exhibits oligopolistic behav~r (presump-
tively established by high concentration but subject to rebuttal by evidence of "competitiv~• 
market behavior or performance); (2) the merging firm is likely to enter the market and has a. 
feasible means of entry other than through merger; (3) entry by the firm would "a.ffer a reason-
able prospect oflong-term structural improvement or other benefits in the target market"; and 
(4) the "firm's premerger presence on the fringe of the target market in fact tempered oligo-
polistic behavior on the part of existing participants in that market." 
In the Marine Bancorporation decision, the Court also clearly distinguished between· the 
situation where a merger eliminates a potential entrant exerting a disciplining effect on the 
market incumbents (perceived potential entry) and the situation where the firm removed by 
merger, while perhaps not perceived as a potential entrant, was likely to enter and reduce 
market concentration (future entry). The first three elements identified by the Court are neces-
sary to establish a Section 7 violation under a future entry theory and all four elements are 
required for a perceived potential entry theory. 
81. Marine Bancorporation requires courts and litigants to focus on the incumbents' pres-
ent and future strategies and the intentions of the potential entrant to be eliminated by merger. 
Thus, the courts have sought to determine whether the incumbents were engaging in "limit 
pricing" to forestall entry by the potential entrant, whether entry was feasible or likely for the 
potential entrant at current price levels, and whether the new entrant would rapidly achieve a 
substantial market share were it to enter. These are all essentially questions relating to strat-
egy, behavior, and intentions which can change quickly. But, the effect of the "advantaged" 
potential entrants in limiting the extent of the incumbents' market power will not. 
Whether or not incumbents now take the "advantaged" potential entrants into account, the 
possibility of entry limits the incumbents' freedom to elevate price above cost. Whether or not 
entry would currently be attractive or even economically feasible for the "advantaged" poten-
tial entrants, it will become so as the market price escalates. And, actual entry will almost 
invariably increase competition by forcing the incumbents to lower the market price or, if they 
fail to decrease their prices to protect their market shares, by reducing concentration. Thus, 
whatever the incumbents' current strategy and however it changes - and however feasible 
entry now is for the "advantaged" potential entrants and whatever their plans - the presence 
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Indeed, the Supreme Court's "essential preconditions" not only 
are often incapable of proof, 82 but the fact that some of the "precon-
ditions" are absent in a situation may actually indicate that the 
merger would cause a severe competitive problem and the presence 
of some "preconditions" may tend to show that the merger will prob-
ably not reduce competition. The absence of oligopolistic behavior 
may reflect the fact that the potential entrant indeed exerts a disci-
plining e.ff ect on the market. 83 That entry is not easy for the potential 
entrant could well indicate that its removal by merger would seri-
ously lessen competition, if the potential entrant is materially more 
capable of entry than others. 84 And, however incumbent firms may 
of one or more "advantaged" potential entrants (or fringe competitors) will limit the incum-
bents' ability to maintain prices substantially above cost. 
If one misses this fundamental point, it is easy to transform an essentially structural inquiry 
into a behavioral one. This is the trap into which the courts and the antitrust enforcement 
agencies have fallen. Thus, parties in potential competition cases have developed massive 
evidentiary records on a broad range of issues: pricing, innovation, and competitive perform-
ance in the target market; the merging firm's capabilities, plans, and intentions to enter in the 
immediate or near future; the likely effect the firm's entry would have on competition in the 
market; and the incumbents' perceptions of the merging firm and whether that perception 
influenced their pricing decisions. Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Stmctural Syn• 
thesis, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 19-25 (1977). 
It is doubtful that the insights gained from this often voluminous evidence provide any 
better basis for determining whether the merger would increase the incumbent firm's market 
power than an inquiry into whether the potential entrant that would be removed by merger 
has a material advantage over virtually all other potential entrants. 
82. The government has prevailed in only two potential competition cases since Marine 
Bancorporation was decided. Yamaha Motor Co. v. FfC, 657 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1981) (a joint 
venture case that could have been decided on straight Sherman § 1 grounds); Tenneco, Inc., 
(1981] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (FfC Complaints and Orders)~ 21,873. 
83. While high concentration should certainly be a precondition for the application of the 
potential competition doctrine, evidence of oligopolistic behavior should not be. Where the 
acquiring firm is actually exerting a disciplining effect on the behavior of a major firm (or 
firms) in the market - the very situation that appears to be of greatest concern to the Supreme 
Court - pricing in the target market may closely approximate that occurring in a perfectly 
competitive market. Apparently, the Court believed that oligopolistic coordination was neces-
sary to keep prices down as well as to hold them above competitive levels. That, however, is 
simply not true. If any established firm in a market keeps prices low for whatever reason, its 
competitors must either follow or face the prospect oflosing market share. J. BAIN, supra note 
19, at 272. Permitting a merger to remove the potential entrant may actually increase the 
likelihood of coordination by permitting incumbent firms to raise prices higher than before, 
thereby making coordination more rewarding. 
Moreover, the absence of parallel pricing behavior does not necessarily mean that the firms 
in a concentrated market are in fact charging competitive prices, optimizing output, or compet-
ing aggressively in innovation, service, or quality. It may only reflect the fact that coordination 
is not complete. 
84. In Marine Bancorporation the Court observed: 
The conceptual difficulty with the Government's approach . . . is that it fails to accord 
full weight to the extensive federal and state regulatory barriers to entry into commerical 
banking. This is of great importance, because ease ef entry on the part ef the acquiringfir,n 
is a central premise ef the potential-competition doctrine. 
418 U.S. at 627-28 (emphasis added). The Court's conclusion is consistent with economic 
theory only in the situation where the price necessary to induce any entry exceeds the maxi-
mum price the existing firms could charge without prompting most purchasers to switch to 
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react to the potential entrant's presence or any future attempt to 
enter, the1potential entrant may have a procompetitive effect by lim-
iting the incumbents' market power.85 Certainly, eliminating the 
"excess baggage" relating to behavioral and strategic considerations 
and focusing the entire inquiry on mobility factors would lead to 
much more rational antitrust enforcement and significant simplifica-
tion of potential competition cases. 86 
alternative products or services. Brodley, supra note 81, at 30 n.119. Otherwise, the higher the 
entry barriers (in Marine Bancorporation, the governmental restrictions on branch banking), 
the greater the pricing power of the incumbent firms and therefore the more important preser-
vation of potential entrants is. Thus, economic theory indicates that the capability of the pro-
posed merger partner to enter the market as compared to other potential entrants should be the 
relevant inquiry. If the merging firm is significantly more advantaged in terms of successful 
entry, it should not matter whether entry for the acquiring firm would be "easy" or "difficult" 
in the abstract. 
85. Any lessening of competition that may result from the removal of a potential entrant 
occurs, if at all, because the pricing and output flexibility of the incumbent firms is increased 
either in degree or in duration. If the existing firms in the market limit prices to forestall entry, 
they sacrifice maximization of present profits for pricing flexibility over the longer term. If 
they fail to take potential entrants into account or choose to raise prices anyway, they achieve 
supracompetitive profits for only a limited period of time. Whatever strategy the incumbents 
pursue, their market power is limited by the conditions of entry. 
Consequi;ntly, the determination of the competitive significance of the merger should not 
tum on whether evidence suggests that firms in the market temper their behavior because of 
the threat of entry by one of the merging firms. This is not to imply that such evidence is not 
relevant, but simply that it is not necessary. The evidence is certainly relevant to the crucial 
aspect of the inquiry - how the conditions of entry affect different potential entrants. It may 
indicate what firms are considered by those in the market to be the most capable of entry and it 
may provide a rough indication of the degree of pricing flexibility firms in the market have. 
Although perhaps less obvious, the Court's concern that the entry by the acquiring firm 
would tend to deconcentrate the industry or have other s_ignificant competitive benefits also 
invites an unnecessary inquiry into the responses of the incumbent firms - in that case, their 
probable response to entry sometime in the future. The Court seems to base its concern on the 
belief that small scale entry is unlikely to have significant procompetitive effects, apparently 
because it feels that a firm with a small market share would not lessen the potential for oligo-
polistic behavior significantly. Yet, even small scale entry may prompt incumbents to lower 
the price level in the market to keep the new entrant from gaining market share. Of course, 
should the incumbents fail to do so, the new firm's market share should grow, probably de-
creasing concentration in the market. Whatever the reaction of the market incumbents, some 
procompetitive benefit is likely either in terms of keeping the price level in the market lower 
than it would otherwise be or in making tacit coordination more difficult. 
86. The quagmire into which the potential competition doctrine has fallen can only be 
avoided if the courts and antitrust enforcement agencies abjure the temptation to rely primar-
ily on behavioral rather than structural considerations. With respect to mergers that are al-
leged to be anticompetitive because they remove a potential entrant, only three structural 
characteristics of the market should be of concern: 
(1) the degree of concentration, 
(2) the mobility factors affecting entry and fringe expansion, and 
(3) how these mobility factors affect the firms most capable of expanding or entering the 
market. 
Where the potential entrant eliminated by merger has no better capability to enter than a 
number of other firms, its removal should have a negligible effect on competition. But, where 
three or four firms have a material advantage over other potential entrants and fringe competi-
tors, the loss of one of the most advantaged firms is likely to grant the market incumbents 
substantially greater pricing and output flexibility. 
The approach to potential competition mergers espoused in this Article is almost precisely 
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4. Horizontal Merger Cases 
Ordinarily, horizontal merger cases, unlike other types of struc-
tural cases, principally concern the risk that the merger may increase 
the potential for coordinated pricing among the dominant firms in 
the market. For this reason, courts and enforcement agencies justifi-
ably give the degree of concentration and the merged entity's market 
share great weight. They have generally considered conditions of 
entry and other mobility factors, if at all, from a very narrow per-
spective. In determining the relevant market, courts have examined 
the ability of firms outside of the market to enter quickly, usually in 
terms of a few weeks or months at most and using facilities already 
in being. 87 In some cases, extreme ease of rapid entry into the rele-
vant market has also led to a conclusion that the merged firm could 
exercise no market power. 88 
This great reliance on market share and concentration data, with 
little consideration of mobility factors, rests on assumptions about 
the nature of the commercial world, the determinativeness of market 
definitions and the predictability of tacit collusion that are simply 
unrealistic. Whatever the definition of the relevant market, firms ex-
ist both within and without it that have varying degrees of advantage 
or disadvantage vis-a-vis the dominant incumbents. 89 Whether the 
dominant incumbents can restrict output below or raise price above 
a competitive level often is primarily a function of the degree of ad-
vantage they have over actual or potential competitors.9° For exam-
that contained in the new Merger Guidelines. u:s. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines 
31-34 (June 14, 1982). 
87. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, ~ 519b, at 349-50. See, e.g., Twin City 
Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264, 1271 (9th Cir. 1975); The Budd 
Co., 86 F.T.C. 518, 572 (1975). 
Considering only the ability of firms to shift production quickly - without significant new 
investment in plant, equipment, and worker training - to define the relevant market has a 
logical economic foundation. See F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 60-61. But, one must recognize 
that the distinction between such short-run "production substitution" and "new entry" is inva-
riably "somewhat arbitrary." Id. 
88. See cases cited in note 39 supra. 
89. Markovits, supra note 14, at 727. 
90. R. PosNER, supra note 2, at 56-59 (collusion is more likely where actual and potential 
competitors have a unit cost disadvantage and where they cannot quickly expand or enter); 
Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 948-50 (extent to which major incumbents can maintain 
price above cost determined by elasticity of supply where market elasticity of demand is low). 
Indeed, the FTC has noted that: 
Current statistical information helps to provide a good snapshot of an industry, but 
consideration of additional market characteristics, entry barriers being the major exam-
ple, may provide a clearer and more accurate picture of the competitive dynamics of that 
industry. Such an inquiry may reveal whether any market power conferred by the merger 
is likely to persist over time and whether market conditions are conducive either to the 
exercise of individual firm market power or to collusive-type behavior. 
Statement of Federal Trade Commission Concerning Horizontal Mergers, supra note 9, at 3-4. 
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ple, there may be 100 firms in a market but three firms with modest 
(10%) market shares may have a substantial advantage over the 
others or be the only firms capable of expansion in a short period of 
time. When such a situation exists and two of the advantaged firms 
merge, the potential for coordinated pricing resulting in substantial 
overcharges would exceed considerably what market concentration 
ratios and other market share indices alone would indicate. Con-
versely, if smaller competitors or potential entrants faced no signifi-
cant disadvantage and could initiate or increase production 
substantially in a year, the merger raises only a remote risk of 
supracompetitive pricing. 
Indeed, once one appreciates that competitors in the market may 
have different degrees of cost advantage or disadvantage, it becomes 
apparent that in certain situations, a horizontal merger can increase 
the dominant firms' pricing flexibility in much the same way as the 
elimination of a potential entrant can. Such an effect could occur 
where most competitors had a significant disadvantage relative to the 
major firms in the market. If one of the advantaged firms acquired 
the sole fringe competitor capable of overcoming that disadvantage, 
the dominant firms would have greater pricing and output 
flexibility.91 
Furthermore, the growing scholarly support for an "economies 
defense"92 to mergers which may substantially lessen competition 
virtually assures that in the near future courts and antitrust enforce-
ment agencies will be asked to evaluate the extent of purported effi-
ciency gains likely to result from a merger. Indeed, because increases 
in efficiency (such as lower costs) that are significant - e.g., 3-5% or 
more of the price - would in virtually all situations override any 
See also U.S Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, Sllpra note 9, at 16-29 (where Justice 
Department finds market shares and concentration figures above threshold levels of concern, it 
will examine entry conditions as well as other factors relating to the "ease and profitability of 
collusion"). 
91. The potential for a lessening of competition in those circumstances has been acknowl-
edged by the FfC. Heublein, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 385, 583-92 (1981). 
92. See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at ~ 940; Edwards, supra note 8; Muris, 
The Efficiency .Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 381 
(1980); Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust .Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 699 
(1977). 
Ironically, while the new Justice Department Merger Guidelines and FfC Statement on 
Horizontal Mergers both refuse to recognize increased efficiencies as a defense in a merger 
case, they both describe the type of evidence their respective agencies would consider persua-
sive proof of the increased efficiencies likely to result from the merger. U.S. Department of 
Justice Merger Guidelines, supra note 9, at 42-43; Statement of Federal Trade Commission 
Concerning Horizontal Mergers, supra note 9, at 9. 
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adverse competitive effects of a merger,93 the magnitude of the prob-
able efficiency gain may well be the principal issue in the case. As 
explained more fully in Part III B,94 estimating the likely increase in 
efficiency (j.e., the extent to which the merger partners can overcome 
a competitive disadvantage) involves almost solely an analysis of the 
mobility factor ·or factors that create the disadvantage. 
In sum, issues pertaining to mobility factors are usually determi-
native in the structural antitrust cases likely to be litigated. In mo-
nopolization as well as vertical and potential competition merger 
cases, virtually the entire focus of the inquiry should relate to condi-
tions affecting entry and expansion. By doing so, much of the time 
and effort devoted to line-drawing quibbles over market definition, 
concentration and shares can be redirected to the analysis of mobil-
ity factors essential to make this market share information meaning-
ful. Likewise, rational analysis of the competitive significance of 
many horizontal merger cases would also be greatly facilitated by 
considering mobility factors instead of relying almost exclusively on 
often indeterminant market definitions and the usually unclear im-
plications of market share and concentration data. 
B. An Analytical Framework for Evaluating Mobility Factors 
The key to economically sound analysis of mobility factors in 
antitrust cases is the development of a coherent analytical approach 
that both reflects the current state of economic knowledge and can 
be readily employed in a litigative context. In this Part, I propose 
such a framework building on the areas of fundamental agreement 
among the leading economists who have written extensively about 
entry conditions. By focusing the analysis on determining how a 
mobility factor permits major incumbent firms to maintain price 
above cost and by emphasizing that some factors have important ef-
ficiency implications, the proposed approach should assist the courts 
and litigants to evaluate mobility factors in a manner more compati-
ble with accepted economic theory. 
I. Constructing the Analytical Framework 
A comparison of Bain's observations at the beginning of his clas-
sic study of entry barriers with Posner's critique of the undisciplined 
evaluation of entry barriers in antitrust cases reveals both the funda-
93. See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, ~ 946d, e; Muris, supra note 92; William-
son, supra note 92. 
94. See text at notes 174-81 infra. 
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mental agreement which exists among economists about the effects 
of mobility factors that are competitively significant and, concomi-
tantly, the proper objectives of mobility factor analysis. Bain ob-
served that the condition of entry into a market could be "evaluated 
roughly by the advantages of established sellers in an industry over 
potential entrant sellers, those advantages being reflected in the ex-
tent to which established sellers can persistently raise their prices 
above a competitive level without attracting new firms to enter the 
industry."95 Bain further noted that the degree of pricing flexibility 
enjoyed by the dominant incumbents would tend to vary with the 
time required for a new competitor to enter and establish itself.96 
Posner adopts a strikingly similar approach. For Posner, an en-
try barrier "is a condition that imposes higher long-run costs of pro-
duction on a new entrant than are borne by the firms aheady in the 
market."97 Posner adds that such barriers have "important policy 
implications," because they imply "the existence of a range within 
which the firms in the market can increase the market price above 
the competitive level without having to worry at all about losing 
sales to a new entrant."98 Posner contends that permanent entry bar-
riers of this sort occur only rarely, but notes the importance of "fac-
tors that do not create a barrier to entry but increase the length of 
time required for new entry to take place . . . ."99 
Stigler, Posner, and their adherents take issue with Bain and his 
followers not with respect to Bain's objectives in assessing the condi-
tions of entry but rather in regard to his identification of certain fac-
tors as "entry barriers." They argue, for example, that labeling 
economies of scale as an "entry barrier'' is misleading because econ-
omies of scale dictate the level of cost-minimi_zing output for all 
firms, including those in the market. 100 Stigler and Posner also criti-
cize the notion (which many attribute to Bain with only limited justi-
fication) that capital costs and product differentiation deserve 
classification as "entry barriers" in any situation where entry on an 
efficient scale requires sizeable amounts of capital or where highly 
advertised products command a substantial price premium. Stigler 
95. J. BAIN, supra note 49, at 3 (italics omitted). Bain defined the "competitive level of 
price" as "the minimum attainable average cost of production, distribution, and selling for the 
good in question, such cost being measured to include a normal interest return on investment 
in the enterprise." Id. at 6. 
96. Id. at 11. 
97. R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 59, citing G. STIGLER, supra note 61, at 67. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. G. STIGLER, supra note 61, at 67-70. 
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contends that these factors only permit incumbent firms pricing flex-
ibility - and thus qualify as "entry barriers" - where the costs of 
obtaining the required capital or of differentiating the product for 
the new entrant exceed the costs for the incumbent firms. 101 
Against the backdrop of the agreed upon objective of mobility 
factor analysis, to determine the degree and duration of the major 
incumbents' pricing flexibility, the economic debate illuminates the 
important considerations involved in assessing mobility factors. 
Given the objective of defining market power, it logically follows 
that all factors, including scale economies, that permit dominant in-
cumbents to attain lower cost than new entrants merit consideration. 
Even where the incumbents' pricing flexibility derives from effi-
ciency advantages, the benefits of those efficiencies may accrue to 
consumers only to the extent that the threat of expanded production 
by new entrants or fringe rivals constrains the incumbents' market 
power, particularly in a concentrated market. Efficiencies that im-
pede mobility deserve solicitude not when estimating the market 
power of the incumbents, but rather when deciding what remedy, if 
any, will most efficiently diminish whatever market power the mobil-
ity factor analysis reveals. But, in determining the extent of market 
power, cost differentials flowing from economies of scale cannot ra-
tionally be ignored. 
The Chicago contention that large capital requirements or brand 
loyalty for incumbents' products do not necessarily denote market 
power likewise raises an extremely important point. Such factors 
sometimes can permit great pricing flexibility. They will allow 
meaningful pricing· flexibility, however, only where they impose 
higher unit costs on new entrants than on the major incumbents or, 
specifically in the case of brand loyalty, new entrants must incur 
higher selling costs for a substantial period of time to erode con-
sumer preferences· for established brands. 
The proposed approach, then, should focus on what possible ef-
fects mobility factors may have that enable major incumbents to 
maintain price above cost for some period of time. The economic 
literature on entry barriers repeatedly recognizes two such e.ff ects. 
The first is the imposition of costs on new entrants and fringe com-
petitors which are higher on a per unit basis than those of the domi-
nant incumbents.102 The second is prolonging the time necessary for 
new entrants and fringe competitors to establish themselves in a 
IOI. Id. at 70. 
102. See note 97 supra and accompanying text; J. BAIN, supra note 19, at 260-63. Note that 
the costs to which Posner, Stigler and Bain refer are unit costs. 
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market.103 Entrenched consumer preferences for established brands 
may also allow incumbents to charge prices exceeding costs104 but, as 
later explained in detail, 105 the key issue in that situation is the cost 
and time necessary for new entrants to erode such preferences. 
Differences in the risk that new entrants or fringe competitors 
face compared to the established incumbents may also affect the de-
gree and duration of the major incumbents' pricing :flexibility.106 
While the effect of mobility factors that create greater risks for new 
entrants may sometimes lead to higher unit costs (such as in the cost 
of capital), recent economic literature indicates that assessing the 
competitive significance of entry risks often involves considerations 
somewhat different from those pertaining to the cost disadvantage 
effects of mobility factors. Most notably, the degree of risk and the 
consequential extent of the major incumbents' pricing flexibility may 
be high or low depending on the amount of the capital invested that 
the entrant could not recover if the entry (or expansion) attempt does 
not succeed.107 Mobility factors, then, can create cost disadvantages, 
risk disadvantages, or time lags. 
Determining which of these three possible effects a purported 
103. Scherer, Posner, and Bain view factors that extend the time that the dominant incum-
bents can enjoy substantial pricing flexibility as material in assessing market power. F. 
SCHERER, supra note 2, at 236; PosNER, supra note 2, at 59; J. BAIN, supra note 49, at 10-11 
(1956). 
104. J. BAIN, supra note 49, at 114-115. 
105. See Section C-3 of this Part, i'!fra. 
106. The greater the risks involved in entry or expansion - that substantial losses will be 
incurred or that a competitive return will not be realized - the less likely that new firms will 
enter or fringe competitors expand. In this sense, the greater risk faced by potential entrants 
and fringe incumbents acts like a cost disadvantage, permitting major incumbents to maintain 
price above cost without attracting entry. Entry and expansion will not occur until the price-
cost margin is sufficiently high to compensate for the risks involved. 
Analyzing mobility factors in terms of risk is important for two reasons. First, in many 
situations, it is not the effect of a mobility factor in creating a cost disadvantage per se that is 
important. Once a new entrant achieves a particular scale of operation or amount of consumer 
acceptance, most, if not all, of its cost disadvantages will usually be eliminated. As 
Stonebraker notes, "[t]he crucial question is whether or not entrants have a reasonable ch~ce 
to attain the stature necessary for success." Stonebraker, Corporate Profits and the Risk of 
Entry, 58 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 33, 35 (1976). 
Second, the potential fqr successful retaliation by the major incumbents should also be 
considered in assessing their market power. Id. Retaliation is more likely to be successful the 
greater the new entrant's initial cost disadvantage, the less certain its prospects for quickly 
overcoming it, and the more funds that must be committed to do so. 
107. See Bailey, Conies/ability and the .Design of Regulatory and Antitrust Policy, 71 AM. 
EcoN. REV. 178, 178-79 (1981); Baumol & Willig, Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry Barriers, and 
Sustainability of Monopoly, 96 Q.J. EcoN. 405, 418-20 (1981). 
Notably, the new Department of Justice Merger Guidelines recognize that "risk" in the 
sense used in this Article may be a "barrier to entry" where a new entrant stands a good 
chance ofnot establishing itself in a market and, to enter, it must invest substantial capital that 
it cannot recover in the event of failure. U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, supra 
note 9, at 37. 
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mobility factor has (if any) is fundamental to sound mobility factor 
analysis. If an alleged mobility factor has none of these effects, it has 
no competitive significance and thus can be ignored. Where a mo-
bility factor does in fact create a cost disadvantage, a risk disadvan-
tage and/ or time lag, determining which effect or effects it has is 
crucial in evaluating the extent to which it permits pricing flexibility. 
Therefore, I propose a framework for mobility factor analysis that 
asks three basis questions: 
(1) How, if at all, does the purported mobility factor permit pricing 
flexibility (j.e., cost disadvantage, risk disadvantage or time lag)? 
(2) How much pricing flexibility does the mobility factor allow (i.e., 
the extent of the disadvantage of the best situated fringe competitors or 
potential entrants vis-a-vis the dominant incumbents)?108 
(3) How long can the dominant firms maintain that degree of pricing 
flexibility (i.e., how long will it take the best situated fringe rivals or 
potential entrants to expand or enter and erode most of their 
disadvantage)? 
I briefly discuss below each type of effect and the approach for eval-
uating its competitive significance. 
Cost .Disadvantages. A mobility factor has a cost disadvantage 
effect when new entrants or fringe competitors must incur higher 
costs per unit of output than the dominant firms in the market. Such 
mobility factors would fall under the Posner-Stigler definition of 
"barriers to entry"109 and are typified by those conditions that Bain 
characterizes as "absolute cost advantages" 110 (although, as we shall 
see, factors of this type may also fall in other of Bain's categories). 
Mobility factors creating a cost disadvantage permit the major firms 
in a market to elevate prices above cost to the extent of their unit cost 
advantage over new entrants or fringe firms. For example, a firm 
that had a patented process enabling it to produce widgets at $1.00 a 
piece would have substantial pricing :flexibility (about 10%) if the 
most efficient process available to all other firms permitted them to 
produce widgets at a cost no lower than $ 1. 10 a widget. 
Risk .Disadvantages. A new entrant or fringe incumbent faces a 
risk disadvantage when a distinct possibility exists that it will not 
achieve unit costs or consumer acceptance comparable to the major 
108. The degree and duration of the dominant incumbents' pricing freedom is determined 
by the extent of the disadvantage and time lag faced by those fringe competitors and potential 
entrants in the best position to expand or enter. See J. BAIN, supra note 19, at 254, 269-70. 
109. See text accompanying note 97 supra. 
110. Bain's "absolute cost advantages" are factors that "place the costs of potential entrant 
firms on a higher level and permit established firms to elevate selling prices somewhat above 
their own minimal average costs without making operations profitable for entrants and thus 
without inducing entry." J. BAIN, supra note 19, at 261. 
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incumbents' and it must invest substantial funds that cannot be re-
covered it if fails ("sunk costs"). m The risk differential exists be-
cause, unlike the new entrant, the major incumbents have, for 
example, already obtained the market share necessary to realize 
scale economies, developed an efficient production process or estab-
lished a reputation among consumers. Where the prospect that new 
entrants will be able to avoid or overcome a material initial disad-
vantage is very uncertain, entry will be unlikely until price levels 
become sufficiently high that new entrants either can expect to re-
cover a premium return on the investment put at risk if they suc-
ceed 112 or can operate profitably despite the disadvantage. For that 
reason, the extent of pricing flexibility permitted by a risk disadvan-
tage can often be assessed adequately by examining (1) the amount 
of capital that would be irretrievably lost if the entry attempt failed, 
and (2) the unit cost differential that would exist, if entrants could 
not avoid or overcome the cost disadvantage. 
Time Lags. Mobility factors may also affect the time necessary to 
enter or expand and to achieve unit costs comparable to those of the 
dominant firms in the market ("time lag" factors). 113 Examples of 
such factors might include those conditions determining the time 
necessary to design, finance and build a manufacturing plant and to 
develop sufficient demand for a new product to permit economical 
production. Obviously, the length of time necessary to enter a mar-
ket, to achieve an efficient level of production, and to obtain wide-
spread consumer acceptance is important in determining the 
duration of the major incumbents' pricing flexibility. A lead time to 
build a facility and to establish a significant presence in the market 
of a year or two may not prove of consequence unless incumbents 
111. Both elements are necessary since, if new entrants can quickly establish themselves in 
a market with no cost disadvantage, incumbents will not be able to raise price above cost. 
And, if new entrants can exit a market with little loss if they fail, there is so little risk involved 
in entry that incumbents dare not offer profit-making opportunities. For this reason, most 
domestic airline city-pair markets perform competitively despite the fact that very few have 
more than one or two carriers. Should the carriers serving a city-pair attempt to raise price, 
airlines serving other markets will simply enter, gather the available profits and depart if the 
"going gets rough" or profits appear higher elsewhere. See Bailey & Panzar, The Contes/ability 
of Airline Markets .During the Transition lo .Deregulation, 44 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 125 
(1981); Baumol & Willig, supra note 107, at 419-20. 
112. The profit premium necessary to induce entry will depend on the chances that the 
firm can overcome its disadvantage and the amount of money it stands to lose if it is 
unsuccessful. 
113. While the time required for entry to occur is usually emphasized in the economic 
literature, the duration of the major incumbents' pricing flexibility really depends on how long 
it takes for a new entrant or fringe competitor to overcome any disadvantage it may face. Jf 
ten years is necessary to achieve consumer acceptance after entry occurs, dominant incumbents 
will have some pricing flexibility long after the new firm has initiated production. 
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could charge prices far above costs in the interim. But time lags of 
five years or more may be significant, and time lags of ten years or 
longer may have a substantial impact on competition. The major 
incumbents would enjoy especially great pricing flexibility if new en-
- trants and fringe competitors would face a substantial unit cost or 
risk disadvantage over most of the period. 
2. The Analytical Framework Avoids Common Pitfalls 
While the proposed approach comports with Bain's stated objec-
tives in analyzing entry barriers, he appears to deviate from this 
framework in his efforts to determine the competitive significance of 
various conditions of entry in particular industries. In large part, 
this apparent deviation reflects an understandable need in a study of 
entry conditions in twenty different industries to rely on easily dis-
cernible attributes ( amount of capital required, extent of advertising) 
as proxies for the more detailed inquiry that, Bain acknowledges, 114 
is required to make any reliable determination of the extent to which 
conditions of entry confer some degree of pricing freedom on incum-
bent firms. Bain's examination of various alleged "barriers to entry" 
in the twenty industries, for example, fails to consider how the al-
leged entry barriers affect the most advantaged potential entrants 
and assumes that those firms - which Bain recognizes determine the 
extent of the incumbents' pricing flexibility115 - are affected in 
much the same way as most other commercial enterprises. 
Unfortunately, many lawyers, economists and judges have 
tended to interpret the various observations that Bain makes about 
the possible impediments to entry into particular industries as gos-
pel, without recognizing that he intended his observations to stimu-
late further inquiry, not end it. In antitrust litigation, this has led to 
the "laundry list" approach mentioned earlier, in which litigants de-
tail as many factors as possible which Bain and others have sug-
gested might indicate that barriers to entry exist. But the fact that an 
efficient plant costs $100 million means nothing in and of itself nor 
does the fact that advertising expenditures amount to 10% of sales, 
that scale efficiencies require a new entrant to obtain 10% of the mar-
ket or that essential know-how can be obtained only at a cost of $1 
million. All of these factors may justify further inquiry, but they do 
I 14. J. BAIN, supra note 49, at 165; J. BAIN, supra note 19, at 282-84 (acknowledging that 
the relationship between the size of the capital investment required for entry and the ability of 
incumbent firms to elevate price without attracting entry is very uncertain). See J. BAIN, supra 
note 49, at 121 (Bain was also uncertain about the relationship between advertising expendi-
tures and incumbents' pricing flexibility). 
115. J. BAIN, supra note 49, at 7-10. 
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not indicate how, if at all, a particular situation affects the extent or 
duration of the incumbents' pricing flexibility. 
Moreover, Bain's classification scheme segments possible entry 
barriers into three or four categories: economies of scale, product 
differentiation advantages and absolute cost advantages ( capital re-
quirements are often considered as a fourth category apart from ab-
solute cost advantages).116 However, ''barriers" caused by factors 
usually classified under one category may, in fact, have vastly differ-
ent effects on pricing flexibility in the market. For example, the fact 
that building a manufacturing facility of minimum efficient scale re-
quires $100 million could conceivably have one of three different 
effects, or none at all. Traditionally, courts have cited such an 
amount of required capital to imply that new entrants would have an 
absolute cost disadvantage, meaning that they must incur a higher 
unit cost (such as a higher interest rate) for the required capital than 
those in the market. If significant new entrants really encounter a 
significant unit cost disadvantage compared with the major firms in 
the market (which is not necessarily true based solely on the amount 
of capital required), incumbent firms would have pricing flexibility 
due to this cost differential. 
It is conceivable, however, that the amount of capital required 
affects pricing flexibility in the market not so much by raising the 
unit costs directly as by causing a risk disadvantage or a significant 
delay in entry, either because the new entrant faces greater risks than 
firms in the market or because financing, designing, and building the 
plant require a long period of time. If the new entrant, for example, 
faces a significant risk that its product will not receive sufficient con-
sumer acceptance to operate an efficiently-sized plant at an economi-
cal rate of output, its decision of what profit premium will induce it 
to enter may depend on the amount of capital at risk. The new en-
trant may requ4'e a significant profit premium - thereby permitting 
greater pricing flexibility in the market - if the $100 million plant 
can only produce a single product. The new entrant may require no 
premium at all if it can readily use the plant to produce other goods, 
if, as it fears, its attempts to develop broad demand for its product 
are unsuccessful. Likewise, a sizeable amount of capital may suggest 
that building the plant requires considerable time but it need not, 
particularly if the construction is not complex and equipment and 
tooling are readily available. 
For many of those same reasons, Bain's classification system 
116. Id. at 12, 15-16. 
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often proves less than helpful in determining how particular factors 
affect the firms most capable of entry. All potential entrants may 
need to invest $100 million to build a plant in order to enter on an 
efficient scale but some may be less affected by any cost or risk differ-
entials or time lag related to the capital cost of the plant. For exam-
ple, one or more potential entrants may. be able (1) to obtain the 
capital at costs comparable to the incumbents, (2) to minimize risks, 
by building a plant easily convertible to their existing product lines 
or (3) to use their existing production facilities to initiate economical 
production of the new product before the new plant is completed. 
C. Applying the Analytical Framework to Traditional 
"Barriers to Entry" 
Focusing on "how" various factors affect major incumbents' pric-
ing flexibility - either due to cost differentials, risk disadvantages or 
time lags - avoids the often confusing classification system estab-
lished by Bain and produces a more disciplined framework for 
meaningfully evaluating the real competitive significance of all pos-
sible condidons of entry in a litigative context. The importance of 
focusing on the effects of mobility factors becomes particularly evi-
dent ifwe now review the types of "entry barriers" identified by Bain 
(absolute cost advantages, economies of scale, product differentia-
tion advantages and capital requirements) in light of more recent 
economic comment and criticism. Such a review will illustrate vari-
ous applications of the proposed approach, indicating how it can be 
used both to determine what mobility factors may be significant and 
to estimate the extent of any pricing flexibility they may create. 
1. Absolute Cost Advantages 
The category of Bain's "entry barriers" that has probably 
prompted the least comment and criticism is "absolute cost advan-
tages." Such factors enable the major incumbent firms to have the 
advantage of lower costs of production or distribution than potential 
entrants (or fringe rivals) at any comparable scale of operation. 117 
As a result, dominant incumbent firms have some freedom to raise 
prices above long-run average cost without attracting new entry be-
cause, even at a supracompetitive price level, new entrants could not 
cover their own costs. 
Bain listed possible causes of such an advantage to include: 
(1) control of superior production techniques by incumbent firms, 
117. J. BAIN, supra note 19, at 260-61. 
August 1982] Mobility Factors 1585 
maintained by patents or secrecy; (2) exclusive ownership by estab-
lished firms of essential or superior resources, such as high-grade ore 
deposits; and (3) the inability of new entrants to obtain necessary or 
superior factors of production (management services, labor, materi-
als, unique location) on terms as favorable as those enjoyed by in-
cumbent :firms.118 Bain also included as an absolute cost advantage 
"less favored access of entrant :firms to liquid funds for investment, 
reflected in higher effective interest costs or in simple unavailability 
of funds in the required amounts." 119 This will be discussed under 
capital requirements. 
Having listed the principal situations where, according to Bain, 
absolute cost advantages are likely to occur, two observations be-
come important. First, the mere fact that potential entrants face ( or 
may face) a cost disadvantage does not necessarily mean that incum-
bent :firms have any substantial market power. Even a firm possess-
ing the patent on the most economical production process will have 
only marginal ability to raise price above cost if other competitors or 
potential entrants can produce almost as efficiently using other meth-
ods. Consequently, meaningful analysis requires some appreciation 
of the magnitude of the cost differential (in terms of the cost per unit 
of output) as well as factors that may enable other firms to compete 
effectively by reducing their costs (lower labor or transportation 
costs, for example ). 120 Second, as demonstrated in the following dis-
cussion, the various factors that lead to significant absolute cost ad-
vantages may also have temporal and risk aspects of importance in 
assessing their impact on competition in the particular market. 
A production process protected by patents or secrecy is a classic 
example of a "cost disadvantage" factor. It creates a cost differential 
either by denying new entrants (or "disadvantaged" incumbents) ac-
cess to the technology necessary to achieve production costs compa-
rable to the "advantaged" :firm in the market or by permitting it to 
exact royalties from others thereby raising their unit costs. The dif-
ference in unit costs in the :first situation or the amount of the royalty 
on a per unit basis in the second determines the extent of ili;e cost 
disadvantage. Ascertaining the competitive effect of the patented or 
secret process also requires examining factors that affect the time 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 261. 
120. It is entirely possible that some potential entrants may actually have a cost advantage 
over the established firms in the market. This may be due to any number of reasons: develop-
ment of a lower-cost process, discovery of a new mineral deposit, lower costs of labor, or 
simply greater efficiency in management and organization. 
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necessary to overcome (or substantially reduce) the cost disadvan-
tage and that determine the risks involved in attempting to do so. A 
patented or secret process may present little potential for the "ad-
vantaged" incumbent to exercise any market power if other firms 
can develop equally cost-effective production techniques in a short 
period of time. But the protected process may well lead to substan-
tial market power if the time required to develop and perfect a new 
process is likely to be lengthy, especially if, in the interim, the cost 
differential is significant. 
Moreover, where it appears somewhat uncertain whether the re-
search will yield an equally cost-effective process, "disadvantaged" 
competitors may also encounter a risk disadvantage which will affect 
the duration of their cost disadvantage. Whether a firm undertakes 
the research to overcome the cost disadvantage will depend on sev-
eral factors relating to risk: the amount of the capital that would be 
irretrievably lost if its research is unsuccessful, the likelihood that 
that particular firm will make the new breakthrough ( as opposed to 
others), and the prospect that, if its research is successful, the firm 
can obtain a significant premium for the risk assumed. 121 Therefore, 
in my example, .risk factors may limit the amount of research under-
taken and, consequently, the likelihood that a technological break-
through will soon overcome the "advantaged" firm's cost advantage. 
No matter how great the risk, however, the maximum extent to 
which the "advantaged" firm can raise the price above cost will al-
ways be determined by the cost differential between the patented 
process and the next most efficient process ( or the unit cost of the 
royalty, if the process is licensed to others). But the likely duration 
of the cost disadvantage will largely depend on the extent of the risk. 
Governmental controll! over entry are also frequently discussed 
in relation to "absolute cost advantages" although their effect is usu-
ally to block entry entirely rather than to create a cost differential 
when the new firm is ultimately allowed to enter. Where entry is 
prohibited - or requires years of regulatory proceedings - elastic-
ity of demand (or rate regulation) rather than potential competition 
limits' the incumbents' pricing flexibility. Consequently, in most 
such situations, the crucial focus of an analysis of entry conditions is 
the extent to which various factors delay entry. 
Aside from patents and governmental licenses, the most fre-
quently cited examples of Bain's "absolute cost advantages" involve 
121. Areeda and Turner also recognize that the significance of a patented or secret process 
is primarily a function of the risk involved in developing a comparable alternative. 2 P. 
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, ~ 409, at 300-01. 
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situations where dominant incumbents control essential or superior 
inputs or can obtain necessary factors of production (management, 
labor, equipment or materials) on better terms than new entrants or 
fringe competitors. Control over an essential or superior input, such 
as iron ore in steel manufacturing, enables the major incumbent or 
incumbents to block entry into the market or to dictate the other 
competitors' costs.122 The same also applies when a firm controls 
access to purchasers in a market, such as the Bell System's monopoly 
of many local telephone systems. But, while the firm that controls 
the indispensable input may have the power, Posner has noted that it 
should have little incentive to restrict entry into the market. Its con-
trol over the essential input enables it "to extract all of the economic 
rents obtainable in the widget market without selling any widgets, let 
alone trying to control the widget market." 123 Of course, this obser-
vation may not apply where the major incumbent enjoys only a lim-
ited ability to exact monopoly profits from its control of a scarce 
resource due to, say, regulation. Moreover, the dominant incumbent 
may view the new successful competitor as a long-term threat to its 
ability to exact monopoly profits from the essential resource. A firm 
dependent on a competitor for an indispensable input is likely to 
have a strong incentive to seek means of producing the final product 
with substitute inputs and to encourage entry by new suppliers or the 
exploration for new sources. 
Posner's comments correctly suggest that control of an essential 
input permits pricing flexibility not so much because of a cost differ-
ential as because of a risk disadvantage vis-a-vis the dominant in-
cumbent. In most situations, the incumbent controlling the essential 
or superior input will maximize profits by selling to all possible pur-
chasers, charging both its own operation and others the full monop-
oly price. But the dominant incumbent's control over the input 
inevitably places a new entrant or fringe competitor at its mercy. 
For that reason, potential entrants and fringe competitors may well 
forego entry or expansion until they can project some premium re-
turn on the capital invested that could not be retrieved in the event 
of failure. If such "sunk costs" are substantial, major incumbents 
may have considerable pricing freedom, especially if potential en-
trants perceive retaliation as a likely prospect. If, on the other hand, 
new entrants can easily exit with only minor losses, the dominant 
firms will have little pricing flexibility. Whatever the "sunk costs," 
122. The materiality of competitors' control of an essential or superior input, of course, 
depends on the magnitude of the cost penalty involved in using the next best alternative. 
123. Posner, supra note 15, at 947 n.65. 
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however, the degree of pricing :flexibility will never exceed the differ-
ence between the cost of using the superior input and the cost of 
using the best substitute. 
Cost disadvantages can also arise from the inability of new en-
trants to obtain management services, materials, superior locations 
or other factors of production on terms as favorable as the dominant 
incumbents. An established incumbent may, for example, have a 
long-term contract to obtain certain raw materials at a price that is 
now below the prevailing market level. The cost disadvantage, of 
course, then is the difference between the price a new entrant or 
fringe competitor has to pay and that which the major incumbent 
pays. A new entrant may also face a nominal disadvantage in ac-
quiring trained management personnel and in obtaining the requi-
site production know-how. Bain found, however, that the effect of 
such cost disadvantages was "negligible or slight" in virtually all in-
dustries he studied. It ordinarily appeared in " 'shake-down' losses 
for a very limited time, or in slightly higher over-all costs for a few 
years."t24 
Labor and transportation costs can also give rise to cost disad-
vantages (and sometimes cost advantages) for a new entrant or 
fringe competitor. A new entrant into the industry can usually avoid 
such cost differences, however, through careful planning. For exam-
ple, it can locate its plant where labor and transportation costs are 
comparable to ( or lower than) those of incumbent firms. Of course, 
significant per unit transportation costs - and, for foreign produ-
cers, tariffs and trade barriers - may impose a major cost disadvan-
tage on a firm seeking to enter a geographic market remote from its 
production facility. 
Aside from transportation costs, tariffs and trade barriers that 
may permit considerable pricing flexibility in geographic markets, 
substantial cost disadvantages arising from Bain's "absolute cost ad-
vantage" category of barriers are relatively rare, as Bain's study ap-
pears to confirm. Bain found "absolute cost advantages" to have 
more than a "slight" effect on pricing flexibility only where domi-
nant incumbents had important patents or know-how, or controlled 
most known ore deposits. 125 
124. J. BAIN, supra note 49, at 149. 
125. In his study of twenty industries, Bain found that absolute cost advantages were no 
more than "slight" in sixteen. Of the remaining four, in two industries - copper and steel -
the cost disadvantage was significant due to the close control of known deposits of copper and 
iron ore by the incumbent firms. Two other industries had significant absolute cost advantages 
due mainly to patents or know-how protected by secrecy. Id. at 155. 
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2. Economies of Scale 
Perhaps no aspect of entry conditions has engendered greater 
controversy than economies of scale. Bain classified economies of 
scale as an entry barrier where (a) "an entrant of minimum optimal 
scale (smallest scale at which lowest unit costs are attained) would 
supply a significant fraction of industry output" and (b) "at appreci-
ably smaller scales, the entrant would have appreciably higher than 
the lowest attainable cost."126 Consequently, a potential entrant 
would face the prospect that, if it entered at minimum optimal scale 
(and incumbent firms did not significantly reduce their output), the 
additional output would cause a substantial decline in the price level 
in the market. On the other hand, if it entered at a scale that would 
not significantly affect the market price, its unit costs would be sub-
stantially higher than the costs of the major incumbents in the mar-
ket. Such economies of scale can result from a number of factors -
the output required to operate the most cost-effective production 
equipment at an efficient level, the minimum size of an efficient dis-
tribution network, the minimum amount of advertising required to 
utilize a particular communications medium effectively, etc.127 
The controversy over economies of scale has arisen - not be-
cause such economies are unimportant in assessing dominant firms' 
pricing flexibility - but because they reflect efficiency factors that 
apply to both incumbents and potential entrants.128 To use the most 
efficient technology on an economical basis requires that any firm 
126. J. BAIN, supra note 19, at 263. 
127. Economies of scale can exist at the specific product, plant, or firm level. Per unit 
production costs may be lower for a product if high-volume machinery can be effectively uti-
lized, set-up cost can be spread over a larger production run, and workers can concentrate on 
specific tasks. Larger plants (making one or more products) may have lower unit costs because 
the size of the required labor for~, the amount of necessary equipment, or the number of 
reserve machines does not increase proportionally with capacity. (This is particularly true in 
process industries.) F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 81-84. 
At the firm or multi-plant level, a larger firm may have lower per unit costs for research 
and development, sales promotion, product distribution, or servicing because large fixed costs 
can be spread over a greater sales volume. See F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 100-04, 108-16; 2 
P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at f 408c. Smaller firms may also not have the sales 
volume or sell in a sufficiently broad geographic area to justify use of particular advertising 
media (e.g., network television) which permits larger firms to achieve lower advertising costs 
per unit of sales. F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 111. 
Cost of raising capital may also be somewhat lower for larger firms. Id. at 104. However, 
the cost differential appears small. Scherer and his associates found a I% higher effective 
interest rate for firms with $5 million in assets compared with those having assets of $1 billion 
or more. F. SCHERER, A. BECKENSTEIN, E. KAUFER & R. MURPHY, THE ECONOMICS OF 
MULTI-PLANT OPERATION 287 (1975). Notably, profit and interest expense normally represent 
only a small portion (approximately 10%) of a product's selling price. See text at note 148 
infra. 
128. G. STIGLER, supra note 61, at 67. 
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achieve a minimum level of sales. Therefore, many economists today 
no longer classify economies of scale under the negative label of "en-
try barrier'' 129 although all recognize that scale economies may cre-
ate substantial cost disadvantages for a new entrant or fringe 
competitor. 
Assessing the effects of scale economies requires that three issues 
be examined: (1) the share of the market necessary to support an 
operation of minimum optimal scale, (2) the size of the unit cost dis-
advantage at substantially smaller scales, and (3) the extent of the 
risk involved in attempting to obtain the market share necessary to 
overcome all or most of the cost disadvantage. 
The scale of entry necessary to obtain minimum costs will deter-
mine whether or not economies of scale are even a relevant consider-
ation. If all, or most, scale economies can be realized with a plant or 
operation designed 130 to produce no more than 1 or 2% of the total 
output in the market, new entrants or fringe competitors will face 
little prospect that their entry or expansion will materially reduce the 
prevailing price level. On the other hand, where realizing economies 
of scale requires an operation designed to supply 5% or more of the 
market, it is at least possible that the major incumbents enjoy some 
pricing flexibility. 131 
The extent of the pricing flexbility, however, will depend not on 
the market share needed to achieve optimium scale but, as the courts 
and FTC often appear to forget, 132 on the size of the unit cost disad-
vantage a firm would suffer by entering at a smaller scale. That 20% 
of the market is required to achieve lowest attainable costs is proba-
bly meaningless if a firm with a plant capacity equal to 2% of the 
sales in the market has less than a 3% cost disadvantage. 133 In con-
trast, the degree of pricing flexibility could be substantial - even 
129. See Posner, supra note 15, at 947. 
130. The relevant consideration is the minimum size of the plant (or operation) required to 
achieve lowest attainable costs, not the rate of output necessary to operate existing plants ( or 
operations) economi~y. The size of existing plants may be well in excess of minimum opti-
mal scale and therefore may have to be operated at high levels of production simply to utilize 
those particular production facilities efficiently. 
131. Bain suggests that the price-depressing effect of entry (or expansion) may begin to 
become significant when the scale of entry represents 4-5 percent or more of the market. J. 
BAIN, supra note 49, at 102-04. 
132. See, e.g., Tenneco, Inc. [1981] 3 TRADE REo. REP. (CCH) (FI'C Complaints and 
Orders)~ 21,873 at 22, 138 (minimum efficient scale plant's capacity about 10% of market; no 
mention of unit cost disadvantage at smaller scales); Fruehauf Corp., 91 F.T.C. 132, at 186-87, 
233 (1978), enforcement denied on other grounds, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979)(economies of 
scale attained with 9% of market; Commission and court ignored degree of cost disadvantage 
at smaller scales). 
133. Indeed, in that situation, a new entrant would tend to depress the market price so 
substantially by entering at minimum optimal scale (20% of the market) that its best strategy 
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though optimal scale corresponded to only 5% of the market - if 
unit costs rose dramatically at slightly smaller scales. This would be 
particularly true if new entrants would have considerable difficulty 
obtaining a sufficient share of the market to support an operation of 
the scale necessary to minimize any cost disadvantage. But where 
new entrants can be relatively confident of securing the requisite 
market share, they face little risk in entering at a scale that would 
enable them to achieve unit production costs comparable to the ma-
jor incumbents. Thus, the extent to which dominant incumbents can 
raise price above costs may be indicated roughly by the extent of the 
cost disadvantage a firm would face with an operation of a scale cor-
responding to the share of the market a new entrant could readily 
expect to obtain. 
Even where economies of scale severely limit the number of firms 
that can profitably operate in a market, the incumbents will have no 
meaningful market power if "sunk costs" involved in entering and 
attempting to gain a large market share are low. Should incumbents 
raise price above a competitive level, new competitors are likely to 
enter - assuming they can recover most of their capital investment 
should they fail or encounter retaliation - because their risk is 
small. Thus, domestic city-pair markets in the airline industry, as 
noted previously, generally reflect competitive performance al-
though, because of scale economies arising from airplane size, most 
are very highly concentrated. Since airlines' principal fixed assets 
(airplanes) are mobile, airlines usually do not need to place substan-
tial capital at risk in entering a new city-pair on an efficient scale.134 
Indeed, economies of scale may not create cost or risk disadvantages 
for new entrants into geographic m!!,rkets in other transportation in-
dustries where the principal fixed assets are mobile, trucking and 
barge shipping, for example. In manufacturing also, the amount of 
sunk costs and therefore risk can sometimes be held to a minimum. 
This would be the case, for example, where entrants could readily 
convert production facilities to the manufacture of. other products 
would be to enter at a very small scale (2% or slightly more). See J. BAIN, supra·note 49, at 
102-04. 
134. See Bailey,supra note 107, at 178; Bailey & Panzar,supra note 111; Brodley,Antitrust 
Policy Under JJeregu/ation: Airline Mergers and the TheoryefContestable Markets, 61 B.U. L. 
REV. 823, 832-35 (1981). 
While "sunk costs" into specific city-pair markets tend to be relatively low, there are nota-
ble exceptions. Those include situations where airport terminal space cannot be obtained, 
where airports impose noise or environmental constraints, and where network scale economies 
( or "hub bing") have enabled the major incumbents to realize lower perpassenger costs. Bailey 
& Panzar, supra note 111, at 132-34; note 164 infra. In those situations, a new entrant may 
need to build its own terminal, re-engine its aircraft, or develop an extensive route system 
around the "hub" airport to enter on a competitive basis. 
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(particularly product lines in which the new entrant is already an 
established competitor) or where they could use distribution net-
works for a number of their other products. 
Thus, the extent to which major incumbents can raise price above 
cost due to scale economies depends on: the difficulty a new entrant 
or fringe competitor has in obtaining the market share necessary to 
avoid most or all of the cost disadvantage, the size of the cost disad-
vantage it would face at smaller scales of entry, and the amount of 
capital it must place at risk. Of those three factors, the cost disad-
vantage associated with a small scale operation-i.e., corresponding 
to a readily obtainable share of the market - will always indicate 
the maximum degree of pricing flexibility the dominant firms may 
have. If entrants or fringe rivals realistically can obtain the share of 
the market necessary to achieve minimum optimal scale in a few 
years - particularly if this requires only modest "sunk costs" - the 
major incumbents will have correspondingly less market power both 
in terms of degree and duration. 135 Where "sunk costs" are small, 
market power will generally be insignificant. 
3. Product Differentiation 
The extent to which the dominant firms in a market can maintain 
prices significantly above their costs depends not only on the ability 
of new entrants and fringe firms to achieve production costs compa-
rable to those of the major incumbents but also on their ability to 
gain buyer acceptance for their product or service. If new entrants 
are precluded from developing products that perform as well as 
those of the dominant incumbents or if substantial time and higher 
per unit selling costs are required to obtain widespread consumer 
acceptance of the new entrant's product, the major firms in the mar-
ket will have pricing flexibility. Indeed, the incumbents' market 
power may be particularly great if new entrants face not only the 
prospect of incurring higher per unit selling costs than the firms es-
tablished in the market but, in addition, would suffer a significant 
cost disadvantage in production because of a suboptimal scale of 
operation. 
Discussions of the factors that affect new entrants' ability to ob-
tain a significant share of the market (if incumbent firms hold price 
above cost) are usually couched in terms of how established firms 
have "differentiated" their products from similar competing prod-
135. That is, the dominant incumbents' cost advantage will be at its highest level upon the 
new competitor's entry and will decline as its market share increases. The crucial factor is the 
length of time the new entrant will suffer a material cost disadvantage. 
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ucts. 136 However, in assessing the major incumbents' market power, 
it is probably more accurate - and certainly more helpful - to 
think in terms of the costs, risks and time required for a new entrant 
to obtain "widespread consumer acceptance" of its product. 137 
While the reasons that buyers pref er incumbent firms' products are a 
relevant consideration, the crucial issue is the difficulty new entrants 
or fringe competitors would have in overcoming buyers' preference 
for established products. 138 Of course, even if no one can erode that 
preference, the degree of the dominant firms' market power cannot 
136. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 375-405; J. BAIN, supra note 49, at 114-43. 
That established sellers have a "product differentiation advantage" means simply that consum-
ers prefer their products or services over those of other competitors, including new entrants. J. 
BAIN, supra note 49, at 116. Such preferences can exist for a number of reasons. Buyers may 
simply be more familiar with established brands and have more experience in using them. 
Buyers may also feel that certain incumbent firms offer higher quality, have a wider selection, 
provide superior service, have more convenient locations, or have other attributes that con-
sumers desire. See F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 375. 
The difficulty with the term "product differentiation" stems from its association in the 
minds of many with only one source of consumer preference: advertising, especially "image" 
advertising. Advertising designed to create a positive subjective image in the consumer's mind 
- rather than to provide information about the product - is believed by some to impose 
social costs by causing buyers to perceive artificial distinctions between similar, if not identical, 
products. See, e.g., Mann, Advertising, Concentration, and Profitahilty: The State of Knowledge 
and Directions for Public Policy, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING, 
supra note 20, at 137, 152-55. But see R. BoRK, supra note 7, at 314-20 (arguing that such 
consumer preferences are simply the return on a firm's capital investment in advertising.) 
The debate over the social and competitive implications of "image" advertising may focus 
on an important public policy issue. It should not, however, obscure the fact that products and 
services are "differentiated" in a number of other ways, most of which represent merely a 
natural and healthy response to legitimate consumer demand. 
137. Examining how the dominant firm (or firms) obtained strong and widespread buyer 
loyalty is not necessarily indicative of the time and expense required for a current new entrant 
to build a consumer following. For example, buyer loyalty for premium-priced, heavily adver-
tised national brands of frozen orange juice was rapidly eroded by wide distribution of low-
priced brands. DelllSetz, The Effect of Consumer Experience on Brand Loyalty and the Struc-
ture of Market Demand, 30 ECONOMETRICA 22 (1962). 
On the other hand, instances abound where a firm - often the first one to exploit a techno-
logical advance or to capture consumers' imagination - has promptly achieved greater buyer 
loyalty for a product, enabling it to command a substantial price premium and market share 
for years in the face of much greater promotional outlays by competitors. See, e.g., F. SCHER-
ER, supra note 3, at 381, 393 n.68 (Clorox had 10% price premium over extensively advertised 
Purex in liquid bleach market; Hershey chocolate held a large market share without any media 
advertising for decades; IBM commanded premium prices for computers without extensive 
promotion); R. Bond & D. Lean, Sales, Promotion, and Product D[fferentiation in Two Prescrip-
tion Drug Markets (FTC Staff Report, 1977)(Merck retained a third of the oral diuretic market 
for more than a decade although charging prices four times that of chemically identical alter-
natives and despite larger advertising expenditures per sales dollar by competitors. Warner-
Lambert's experience with Peritrate for angina pectoris was similar); Buzzell & Farris, Market-
ing Costs in Consumer Goods Industries, in STRATEGY + STRUCTURE = PERFORMANCE 122, 
128-29 (l'horelli ed. 1977)(study of consumers' goods markets showed that market pioneers' 
advertising and promotion costs were 1.45% lower as a percent of sales than early entrants that 
were not pioneers; late entrants spent 2.12% of sales more on advertising and promotion than 
established but non-pioneer incumbents.) 
138. Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The ReaLemon Case, 127 
U. PA. L. REV. 994, 1034-35, 1040 (1979). 
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exceed the magnitude of any differential in price between their prod-
ucts and comparable products of fringe competitors. 
The ability of a new entrant to offer a product that is in fact com-
parable to those preferred by consumers depends, in the first in-
stance, on its ability to develop such a product. Where the product 
design, formula or its unique features, is protected by patents, copy-
rights or trade secrets controlled by an incumbent firm, new entrants 
(or fringe rivals) may either be denied the opportunity of offering 
comparable products or have to incur royalty fees that increase their 
unit cost disadvantage vis-a-vis the established incumbents. Conse-
quently, the degree of the major incumbents' pricing flexibility will 
depend on the size of any unit cost differential (if the patented supe-
rior design is licensed to competitors) or the size of the price pre-
mium buyers will pay for the superior product over the most 
preferred alternative. The duration of the incumbents' pricing flex-
ibility will, as discussed previously, depend on the time required to 
"design around the patent" and, if this requires substantial invest-
ment in research and development, the risks involved. 139 
Where new entrants or small incumbents can offer products com-
parable or superior to those of the dominant incumbents, any 
residual pricing flexibility major incumbents may have is attributa-
ble to factors that make it costly or difficult for a new entrant to 
obtain widespread buyer acceptance of its product. Any product or 
service unfamiliar to most prospective purchasers almost invariably 
has some disadvantage vis-a-vis competing products that are used by 
a large number of consumers. This means that a new entrant ( or 
fringe incumbent with only a small market share) has an initial bur-
den of informing a broad spectrum of possible purchasers about the 
product and of :finding ways of inducing potential purchasers to sam-
ple it. 140 Even if consumers believe that the product itself is compa-
139. See text at note 121 supra. 
140. The ability of a new entrant to erode brand loyalty for established products appears to 
relate primarily to two factors: the risk consumers perceive in trying a new product and the 
ability of consumers to compare it with established brands. 
Nagle observes that brand loyalty is attributable not to the brand name itself but to the 
consumer's knowledge that a brand is superior to most others for his taste. If, after sampling a 
new brand, a consumer considers it as good as the established brands he normally purchases, 
he will not pay a premium for them over the new brand. Nagle, .Do Adverlising-Profitability 
Studies Really Show that Advertising Creates a Barrier to Ent,y? 24 J. LAW & ECON. 333, 343-
44 (1981). Consequently, the fundamental problem for new entrant is enticing consumers to 
purchase its product and to convince them that the new product is comparable or superior to 
the leading brands. 
Consumer and economic studies indicate that consumers are less willing to sample an un-
known product where there are greater perceived consequences if the product does not per-
form as well as products the consumer normally purchases. Schmalensee, supra note 138, at 
1037-38. This probably explains why large price differentials exist among therapeutically simi-
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rable in quality to those of established firms, purchasers may be 
reluctant to buy it from sales outlets that have a poorer reputation 
for reliability and service than those of the established producers.141 
To overcome the lack of widespread consumer acceptance, a new 
entrant may have to incur significantly higher selling costs per unit 
of sales than incumbent firms for a period of time (thereby incurring 
a cost disadvantage), offer a lower price than its competitors to in-
duce prospective customers to try its product, or do both.142 How 
long a new entrant must incur higher per unit selling costs or charge 
a lower price in order to obtain widespread consumer acceptance 
will determine the degree as well as the duration of the incumbent 
firms' pricing :tlexibility.143 Where potential entrants reasonably can 
project the duration of any significant preference for established 
firms' products, they can estimate the extent of the major incumbent 
firms' pricing :flexibility on the basis of the average cost disadvantage 
and the average price differential over the period required to gain 
widespread consumer acceptance. While developing such estimates 
may appear difficult, the successful experience of former new en-
trants and small competitors often provides fairly reliable indica-
tions of the marketing techniques, costs, and time required to obtain 
lar prescription and proprietary drugs. Notably, some studies indicate that, even for relatively 
inexpensive goods (such as bread and beer) where any unfavorable consumption experience is 
likely to be trivial, consumers will remain attached to familiar brands until the price differen-
tial becomes significant. Id. at 1039. Thus, where there is greater risk associated with trying 
an unknown brand, the lower the price necessary to induce consumers to do so and the more 
extensively the attributes of the product must be disseminated through advertising. 
The time and cost necessary to erode buyer loyalty also depends on how easily consumers 
can evalute the new product. If a single sampling is sufficient, buyer loyalties for established 
brands may be short-lived. Id. at 1041. On the other hand, where several samplings are neces-
sary to evaluate a product (or "acquire a taste for it") or consumers cannot meaningfully com-
pare competing brands (as is often the case with drugs), a new entrant may have to promote its 
product extensively and charge a low price for an extended period of time to establish its 
product in the market. 
141. See J. BAIN, supra note 49, at 131. 
142. Id. at 116-17. 
143. Bain provides the following example: 
Suppose that all established sellers of electric shavers have equal advantage, and that 
an entrant to the market would either have to incur, on the average for a period of ten 
years, one dollar per shaver more in advertising costs or receive a price of one dollar less 
per shaver than established sellers, regardless of the scale which the entrant aims to attain. 
Suppose also that after ten years in the market, no disadvantage is anticipated. The en-
trant, averaging his first ten-year disadvantage over the anticipated outputs of as many 
years as he takes into account, and with appropriately increasing discount for interest and 
risk of successively more remote years, will presumably consider himself at a net disad-
vantage for his total future operation of something less than one dollar per shaver. Then 
established firms should presumably be able to set price up to a similar amount above 
minimal costs without attracting entry, since at lower prices the entrant would anticipate a 
net loss on his total further operation. 
Id. at 117. 
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buyer acceptance in a particular industry.144 
Sometimes, however, one may be uncertain of the size and dura-
tion of any cost or price differential that a new entrant would have to 
incur to obtain widespread consumer acceptance. The uncertainty 
will probably reflect the absence of many situations where former 
new entrants or fringe competitors successfully eroded consumer 
preference for established brands in the particular industry or related 
industries. It may also reflect the fact that apparently well-conceived 
and expensive marketing campaigns in the industry often have 
failed. It is important to recognize, however, that this very uncer-
tainty probably indicates that any new entrant would consider any 
effort to obtain widespread buyer acceptance to be risky. Whether 
the risk is sufficiently great to deter new entrants from mounting a 
major campaign to erode consumer preference for established 
brands depends on the amount of "sunk costs" involved. If the 
"sunk costs" are small, 145 new entrants and fringe competitors are 
likely to launch major promotional programs and some will proba-
bly succeed. In this situation, the dominant incumbents' pricing flex-
ibility will depend on the cost disadvantage the new entrant faces 
during the course of the promotional campaign and the time re-
quired to eliminate the disadvantage. On the other hand, if "sunk 
costs" are substantial, major promotional efforts will probably be in-
frequent and it will be far less likely that new entrants will erode the 
consumer preference for established brands in the short or medium 
term. 
The cost and risk disadvantages associated with the difficulties 
involved in obtaining consumer acceptance will be compounded 
where unit costs of production or distribution are significantly higher 
for firms operating at suboptimal scale. Under such circumstances, a 
new entrant faces a cost differential equal to the sum of its cost dis-
advantage in marketing and its cost disadvantage in production or 
distribution for the time necessary to obtain a sufficient share of the 
market to operate at optimal scale.146 If several years are required to 
obtain such a segment of the market, incumbents can maintain 
prices above costs by an amount comparable to the new entrant's 
144. See text at note 166 i'!fra. 
145. The materiality of the "sunk costs" -and therefore the risk-is primarily a function 
of the likelihood that the expenses of the promotional campaign can be recovered. Thus, sunk 
cost will tend to be slight if such expenses represent a very small percentage (e.g., 1 or 2%) of a 
fringe competitor's anticipated sales over five to ten years. Sunk costs and risk will be high 
where recovery of most or all of the sunk costs depends on the promotional campaign being a 
complete success. 
146. J. BAIN, supra note 49, at 117. 
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total cost disadvantage. Moreover, where a new entrant faces the 
risk of never obtaining a sufficient market share to support opera-
tions at a minimum optimal scale level, it may either require a sub-
stantial risk premium on its total sunk costs to induce it to enter or 
enter only if production at a suboptimal scale appears profitable. 
4. Large Capital Requirements 
Bain and others have considered the need to expend substantial 
funds to enter into production on an efficient scale as an entry bar-
rier. Bain was concerned about two particular consequences that 
might flow from the need for a substantial capital investment. The 
first was that the new entrant might have to pay more to attract the 
requisite funds (f.e., have higher interest costs) than the incumbent 
firms. The second was that funds of the required magnitude simply 
may not be available to many firms. 147 
While conceivably either of these effects could confer greater 
pricing flexibility on major incumbents in the market, it is questiona-
ble whether the traditional analysis of capital requirements as an en-
try barrier - relying exclusively on the size of the required 
investment - is helpful in determining the degree, if any, that domi-
nant firms in the market can raise price above cost. In the first place, 
while most new entrants may incur a higher cost of capital because 
they have less certain prospects, this will usually translate into only a 
slight unit cost penalty. As Posner has observed, interest and profit 
rarely exceed 1 % of a manufacturing firm's sales price and often rep-
resent a much smaller percentage.148 Consequently, even if the new 
entrant had to pay an interest rate (or promise shareholders a return) 
of 30%, its unit costs would usually be only two percent higher than 
those of firms paying a 10% interest or return rate. Notably, to Bain, 
unit cost differentials of 1 or 2% indicated low entry barriers. 149 
In the second place, the mere fact that many firms cannot raise a 
substantial amount of capital for a particular venture is meaningless 
as long as a significant number of firms can. While Bain attempted 
to provide some benchmarks for determining what amount of capital 
might confer pricing flexibility on market incumbents, he readily ac-
knowledged that a number of industrial giants could raise capital far 
in excess of what he classified as "very large."150 Indeed, for most 
industries, a substantial number of firms exist for which raising the 
147. J. BAIN, supra note 19, at 261, 283; J. BAIN, supra note 49, at 146. 
148. Posner, supra note 15, at 945. 
149. J. BAIN, supra note 49, at 170. 
150. J. BAIN, supra note 19, at 283-84; J. BAIN, supra note 49, at 158-59. 
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necessary capital to build a plant of minimum optimal scale should 
not pose a problem assuming a sufficiently high projected return on 
investment.151 
These two observations suggest that large capital requirements 
rarely will confer significant pricing flexibility on firms in a market 
unless the most advantaged potential entrants face risks well in ex-
cess of those inherent in the uncertain prospects of any new under-
taking. Risks of such a magnitude would appear almost inevitably 
to involve other mobility factors (e.g. , patents, economies of scale, 
entrenched buyer preferences) that a new entrant may find difficult 
to overcome. 
As noted in the previous discussions of other traditional "entry 
barriers," risks creating a significant degree of pricing flexibility for 
incumbent firms only exist where two conditions are present. First, 
the failure to overcome the particular disadvantage would create a 
substantial cost differential vis-a-vis the dominant incumbents for an 
extended period of time. 152 Second, the amount of the capital placed 
at risk in attempting to overcome the disadvantage must be 
substantial. 153 
It follows that capital requirements in and of themselves very sel-
dom constitute significant "barriers to entry" or mobility factors but 
rather deserve consideration as aspects of risks that new entrants 
may encounter due to other mobility factors. 154 Unless they are 
truly enormous, capital requirements should therefore be assessed in 
151. J. BAIN, supra note 19, at 283 (although ranks of potential entrants often "greatly 
thinned" by very large capital requirements, "usually there will be some potential entrants left 
who could, if sufficiently attracted, 'raise the money' "). 
152. To illustrate this point, assume that new entrants can easily obtain 5% of the market 
but, attempting to obtain a 10% market share would involve considerable uncertainty and 
require large expenditures for promotion. The dominant incumbents' pricing flexibility would 
be substantial if firms with less than 10% of the market had unit costs 20% higher than the 
major incumbents'. Their pricing flexibility would be small if the cost disadvantage for firms 
with small market shares (5% or less) was only 3%. 
153. As noted previously, the substantiality of the amount of capital placed at risk may 
depend in large part on how large it is relative to the new entrant's or fringe firm's anticipated 
sales in the market ifit cannot overcome its disadvantage. See note 145 supra. 
154. The new Merger Guidelines seem to agree generally with the view espoused in this 
Article that capital requirements themselves are not an entry barrier but rather are important 
in assessing the risk disadvantage created by other factors. Unfortunately, the Guidelines' dis• 
cussion of this point is not a model of clarity and seems to suggest that the risk disadvantage 
arises solely from potential entrants' lack of the ''necessary skills and knowledge to succeed," 
Since skilled and knowledgeable managers and personnel can almost always be hired away 
from the incumbents, this fact should not often create a risk of sufficient magnitude to confer 
any meaningful pricing flexibility on the firms in the market. More likely causes of high risk 
are cost disadvantages due to patents, economies of scale, and entrenched buyer preferences 
which even managers experienced in the industry may not be able to overcome. See U.S. 
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, supra note 9, at 37. 
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conjunction with the specific mobility factor involved, as has been 
done in the previous discussions of traditional "entry barriers." 
5. Analyzing Mobility Factors in General 
This extended review of the "entry barriers" identified by Bain 
illustrates the basic benefit of the proposed analytical approach. It 
provides a disciplined framework for determining whether a particu-
lar mobility factor is competitively significant by focusing on how 
much pricing flexibility major incumbents have. As the review dem-
onstrates, all significant effects of mobility factors can be classified in 
terms of cost disadvantage, risk disadvantage, and time lags. 
This approach avoids much of the confusion inherent in Bain's 
scheme and in its misinterpretation in court and FTC decisions. Al-
though the proposed approach requires considerable discipline and 
logic in application, attorneys and judges having no more than a ba-
sic understanding of economics should be fully capable of using it. 
Ill. MOBILITY FACTOR ANALYSIS IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION 
The proposed approach to analyzing mobility factors has impor-
tant implications for courts and litigants in structural cases and, in-
deed, in all antitrust cases where market power is a consideration.155 
By following the analytical approach in discovery and trial prepara-
tion, litigants often can develop evidentiary records from which rea-
sonable estimates of the degree and duration of the dominant 
incumbents' market power can be made. Use of the approach can 
likewise assist in ascertaining the extent to which a merger or exclu-
sionary practice may increase market power by reducing elasticity of 
supply. Similar techniques can provide an indication of the in-
creased efficiencies that realistically may be anticipated to result 
from some mergers. 
While the factual information from which to derive reasonable 
155. Some unspecified degree of market power must be shown to establish a tie-in viola-
tion. See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977); 
Ungarv. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1223-24 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
823 (1976). Indeed, one provocative comment suggests that whether the tie-in increases the 
defendant's market power by raising entry barriers be the principal criterion for liability. 
Note, A New Approach to the Legality of Franchising Tie-Ins, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1297-
1304 (1981). 
Some recent authority also suggests that in "rule of reason" cases under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, some proof of significant market power may be required. See, e.g., Gough v. 
Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 388-89 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979); Oreck 
Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 563 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 1977), '!!fd. on rehearing en bane, 579 F.2d 
126, 130 n.S (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978). But see Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 
622 F.2d 1068, 1081 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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estimates may not always be available, in most situations such infor-
mation probably exists simply because firms in the market, those ~ 
related industries, and persons who advise them have usually had to 
consider significant mobility factors in making major investment de-
cisions. Given the fact that rational decision-making in structural 
cases necessitates consideration of mobility factors - indeed, the de-
cisional issues in certain types of cases relate primarily to mobility 
factors - inquiries into the competitive implications of mobility fac-
tors would be warranted even at the cost of prolonging litigation. 
Contrary to the prevailing wisdom, however, the examination of 
mobility factors under the proposed analytical approach should gen-
erally serve to simplify and streamline litigation. While litigants fre-
quently engage in broad-ranging and unfocused discovery and 
evidentiary presentations on entry barriers today, use of the pro-
posed approach would create incentives for counsel to concentrate 
on showing how the important mobility factors affect the fringe com-
petitors and potential entrants most capable of expansion and entry. 
In lieu of extensive litigation on a vast range of issues in monopoli-
zation, potential competition, and vertical merger cases, the trial 
often could focus primarily on the significant mobility factors. Even 
in horizontal merger cases, litigants would be less likely to perceive 
that market definition alone will determine the outcome if mobility 
factors were seriously considered. Consequently, much of the effort 
now devoted to developing voluminous evidence in order to "tip the 
balance" on the elusive market-definition issue may be channeled to 
developing meaningful evidence on mobility factors and market 
power. 
A. A Practical Means of Assessing Elasticity of SUJJJJ/y and 
Estimating Market Power 
The use of the proposed method of mobility factor analysis to 
estimate the market power of a firm or group of firms follows logi-
cally from the objectives of the analytical approach. It seeks to de-
termine the extent to which fringe expansion and new entry limit the 
dominant firms' ability to maintain price above cost. Thus, while it 
does not forecast how much new supply will be added to the market 
with each incremental increase in price above cost - as quantitative 
estimates of supply elasticity would require156 - it does provide a 
reasonable basis for determining the bounds that market elasticity of 
supply places on the major incumbents' market power. 
156. See Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 944 n.17. 
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Where the product market definition includes all products to 
which consumers are likely to switch with a modest increase in 
price, 157 elasticity of supply and market share will be the principal 
determinants of the market power that a firm or group of firms has. 
Consequently, considering the outer bounds of the major incum-
bents' pricing flexibility - as derived through mobility factor analy-
sis - together with the market share of the firm (or firms) involved 
in the litigation permits a reasonable assessment of its (their) market 
power. In horizontal merger cases, where the primary concern is the 
increased potential for coordination among the major incumbents, 
the proposed analytical approach also allows courts to assess the 
dimensions of the welfare loss if such coordination results from the 
merger. And, in situations where the alleged anticompetitive effect is 
to increase market power by reducing market elasticity of supply -
as in monopolization and potential competition merger cases - the 
proposed analytical approach affords a means of estimating the ex-
tent of the likely increase in market power, if any. 
While admittedly rough, this method of assessing market elastic-
ity of supply and market power offers a practical means of evaluat-
ing in actual litigation the influence of supply elasticity. Indeed, it 
would appear to offer one way of using the essence of the theoreti-
cally-attractive Landes and Posner model for calculating market 
power, 158 which would otherwise rarely prove useful in actual prac-
tice because of the difficulties in quantifying market elasticities of 
demand and supply. · 
Using mobility factor analysis to estimate market power is practi-
cal in antitrust litigation for two fundamental reasons. First, basic 
information about the significant mobility factors and their competi-
157. As noted previously, this is the basic approach that courts have historically taken in 
defining the relevant product market: using the criteria of reasonable interchangeability of use 
and cross-elasticity of demand. See note 29 supra. 
Where a number of reasonable market definitions are possible in a particular case, see L. 
SULLIVAN, supra note 14, at 42-43, using the market definition that includes all reasonable 
substitutes and then analyzing elasticity of supply through the proposed analytical approach 
should provide a sound basis for assessing the major incumbents' market power and the extent 
to which it is likely to be increased by the merger. · 
This, in essence, has been the approach to market definition followed by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board in recent merger cases. Although geographic markets could be defined on a 
national or regional basis because entry into routes is generally easy, the Board has focused on 
individual city-pairs as the relevant markets because passenger demand is city-pair specific. 
(A passenger wants to fly from Chicago to Dallas and generally does not consider a flight from 
Chicago to Denver as an alternative.) In this way, the Board's merger cases concentrate on the 
factors affecting entry into individual city-pairs. If potential entrants face substantial disad-
vantages or time lags in entry, the incumbents could exercise great market power. If entry is 
easy, they will have little pricing flexibility. See Continental-Western Merger Case, CAB No. 
38733, slip op. at 2-5 (issued June 3, 1981). 
158. Landes & Posner, supra note 3. 
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tive effects is generally available. Second, the inquiry can be rela-
tively confined, focusing on how the significant mobility factors in a 
market (rarely more than one or two) affect a few firms (those fringe 
competitors and potential entrants in the best position to expand and 
enter). 159 Indeed, as discussed later, by imposing a framework for 
discovery and trial preparation based on the proposed approach to 
mobility factor analysis, a court can ensure that the examination of 
issues relating to mobility factors proceeds in a disciplined and man-
ageable way. 
I. Sources of Ieformation on Mobility Factors 
Litigants can obtain considerable information detailing the sig-
nificant effects of mobility factors from a variety of sources. Firms in 
the industry will logically consider mobility factors in their business 
planning and frequently have devised means of estimating cost dis-
advantage effects. Obviously, firms that have considered entry prob-
ably have particularly valuable information from the perspective of 
a new entrant. And a host of specialized business advisors and sup-
pliers - equipment manufacturers, advertising agencies, marketing 
consultants, research advisors and production and design engineer-
ing firms - will have vast experience in determining the cost, risk 
and time lag effects of specific types of mobility factors. While it 
may be necessary to obtain some cost data from firms in the indus-
try, estimating the extent of cost disadvantages ordinarily will not 
require any detailed analysis of incumbent firms' accounting records 
or employment of cost accounting techniques. 
The firm holding the patent on the most efficient process or con-
trolling a superior input almost surely will be aware of the size of the 
cost advantage over using other processes or inferior inputs. 160 
Moreover, other firms in the market and their research consultants 
will undoubtedly know if the patent can be "invented around" easily 
and have some idea of the sunk costs and risk involved in attempting 
to do so. Likewise, transportation costs can be obtained from the 
incumbent firms, transportation companies or regulatory agencies. 
And plant design consultants and suppliers of new and used equip-
ment can usually provide estimates of both the original cost of an 
159. Assessing the effect of mobility factors on four to six of the most advantaged fringe 
firms and potential entrants should usually provide a reliable indicator of supply elasticity. 
The number assures both that enough firms will be interested in expansion or entry into the 
market (as opposed to pursuing other profit opportunities) if the major incumbents attempt to 
exercise their market power and that sufficient output will be added to the market to keep the 
dominant incumbents from raising prices further. 
160. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 682-89 (1980). 
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efficient production facility and its disposal value so that "sunk 
costs" can be established. 
Engineering studies can provide much information about the cost 
and risk effects of scale economies, at least for production facilities, 
equipment and processes.161 Through interviews of engineers in the 
industry and in outside machinery and plant design firms, litigants 
ordinarily can d~velop fairly reliable estimates of scale economies 
for a plant in a few months.162 Where litigants· cannot undertake 
such an investigation (such as when a preliminary injunction is 
sought), other more immediately accessible measures could be used 
to indicate roughly the share of the market necessary to minimize 
any cost disadvantage. For example, the average share of total in-
dustry sales accounted for by plants making up the top fifty percent 
of the industry's plant size distribution has been shown to be signifi-
cantly correlated with engineering estimates. 163 
Economies of scale, of course, can be important in areas other 
than production. Usually firms in the market or in related industries 
have means of assessing the scale-cost relationship if it is significant 
to their business. Advertising agencies or corporate advertising de-
partments, for example, are likely to have considered the relative ef-
fectiveness and cost of using network television advertising versus 
spot advertising for regionally-sold products. And in the airline in-
dustry, the major carriers have sophisticated techniques, some com-
puterized, for evaluating the economies of scale involved in 
"hubbing,"164 which is often of vital importance in their route 
161. "[C]arefully executed engineering estimates undoubtedly provide the best single 
source of information on the cost-scale question." F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 94. The lead-
ing studies of scale economies using the engineering approach are F. SCHERER, A. BECKEN-
STEIN, E. KAUFER & R. MURPHY, supra note 127; J. BAIN, supra note 49. 
162. Most larger companies employ engineers who specialize in plannning and design-
ing new production units and plants. In smaller enterprises, the same job is done by 
generalist senior engineers or other executives. Both small com_eanies and large also draw 
upon the special expertise of outside machinery and plant design firms. The persons or 
groups performing these functions accumulate much information on alternative equip-
ment and plant designs and the associated investment and operating costs. This expert 
knowledge can be tapped through interviews and questionnaires to estimate cost-scale 
relationships and minimum optimal scales. 
F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 94. 
163. F. SCHERER, A. BECKENSTEIN, E. KAUFER & R. MURPHY, supra note 127, at 182-83; 
Weiss, Optimal Plant Size and the Extent of Suboptimal Capacity in EsSAYS ON INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION IN HONOR OF JoE s. BAIN 126-34 (R. Masson & P. Qualls eds. 1976). The 
underlying data can be derived from U.S. Census reports. See F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 
95. 
164. At airports centrally located in major regions of the country (e.g., Atlanta, Chicago, 
Dallas, Denver, and St. Louis}, some airlines have built "hub and spoke" route systems. These 
route systems permit passengers commencing (or ending) their journey at smaller cities in the 
region to fly into the "hub" airport and transfer to flights to many different destinations. If 
groups of incoming and outgoing flights (so-called "banks") are well-timed, the passenger 
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planning.16s 
Estimating the cost disadvantage, greater risk, and the time re-
quired for a new entrant to obtain widespread consumer acceptance 
for a product may sometimes prove more difficult. Of course, the 
experience of new entrants and fringe competitors in the past (in-
cluding their per unit selling costs and the price differentials they 
maintained vis-a-vis the established brands) should provide a rea-
sonable indication of the disadvantage and time lag other firms are 
likely to encounter. In particular, their experience would provide 
valuable information on the two key factors that determine the abil-
ity of a new entrant to erode brand loyalty: the risk consumers per-
ceive in sampling a new product and the ability of consumers to 
compare it with established brands. 166 Even in situations where suc-
cessful new entry in the market or in related markets has been mini-
mal, marketing consultants and advertising experts familiar with the 
general category of products involved usually can outline the type of 
promotional campaign that would be necessary to obtain buyer ac-
ceptance, along with the estimates of its costs, its duration, and per-
haps its likelihood of success. 
2. .Developing an Evidentiary Record 
While extensive information about mobility factors that may be 
from the small city will have a natural incentive to remain on the same carrier for the next leg 
of this journey. See Brodley, supra note 134, at 823 n.153. 
As a carrier with an existing "hub and spoke" system enters new routes emanating from the 
hub, it attracts passengers on its existing segments because it can offer single-carrier service 
between the other end of the new route and all cities it already serves beyond the hub. The 
added passengers (and revenue) on the existing routes come at little additional cost because the 
airline is already providing service, almost invariably with many unoccupied seats. At the 
same time, on any particular segment, a hubbing carrier will have a higher load factor (all 
other things being equal) because it can attract a disproportionate percentage of the passengers 
traveling to destinations beyond the hub. 
Because minor changes in load factors in the airline industry often mean the difference 
between large profits and major losses, hubbing can be a very significant scale economy where 
a substantial portion of the traffic in a city-pair connects at the hub. For example, airlines with 
developed hubs can sometimes obtain a greater profit on a route than competitors with operat-
ing costs that are 40-50% lower. 
165. In the second Continental-Western merger case, both the CAB staff and the merging 
carriers utilized these techniques to develop projections of anticipated traffic, revenue, profit-
ability, and risk for potential entrants into routes emanating from Denver. Continental-West-
ern Merger Case, CAB No. 38733 (issued June 3, 1981) (copy on file with the Michigan Law 
Review). The consultants for the CAB staff developed estimates for 14 carriers with respect to 
17 different Denver city-pairs and the merging parties internally developed estimates for even 
more carriers for 7 Denver city-pairs. While the studies were somewhat complex, both were 
completed in 6 to 8 weeks. Indeed, the trial was finished 2 1/2 months after the merger appli-
cation was filed. 
166. See Schmalensee, supra note 138, at 1041 (proposing a ready means of empirically 
determining consumers' perceived risk in trying a new product and their ability to evaluate it, 
based on the actual experience of a smaller competitor). 
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important in a market is usually obtainable, the first step for counsel 
seeking to develop evidence from which to estimate market power is 
to confine the inquiry. To do so requires that he determine the mo-
bility factors that may create a significant disadvantage or time lag 
and identify the fringe competitors and potential entrants in the best 
position to expand and enter. These steps necessarily occur simulta-
neously since the reason some firms are more capable of expanding 
or initiating production than others is that they are less disadvan-
taged by mobility factors. 
In cases where the geographic market is regional ( or foreign pro-
ducers face little or no cost disadvantage due to transportation, im-
port duties, or trade barriers) this process will be simple. The most 
likely entrants will be firms in neighboring geographic areas ( or for-
eign producers) and the cost disadvantages, if any, are probably at-
tributable to transportation expenses and consumer preference for 
local brands.167 Other cases will require more basic information 
about the industry, primarily the facilities and expertise needed to 
develop, produce, and market the product successfully. Litigants 
often can obtain such information as well as information about the 
general capabilities of the smaller firms in the market and the major 
competitors in related industries through a few interviews with busi-
nessmen in the market and others who follow it, especially stock 
analysts, major purchasers, and economic forecasting firms. 
After a few well-placed interviews, a rough ranking of fringe 
competitors and potential entrants can generally be made. In this 
way, discovery (or informal interviews) to obtain more information 
about the apparently "most advantaged" fringe firms and potential 
entrants can begin in a matter of weeks. At the same time, counsel 
may want to determine whether other firms, that initially seem more 
disadvantaged, have capabilities that have been overlooked. Since 
fringe competitors and potential entrants usually fall into natural 
groupings, interviews and limited discovery focusing on representa-
tive firms in each group should indicate whether the initial rough 
ranking needs to be modified. 
Proceeding in this manner, counsel should be in a position - at 
an early pre-trial stage - to select with considerable confidence the 
half-dozen or so fringe competitors and potential entrants most ca-
pable of expansion and entry and to identify the significant mobility 
factors (usually one or two) that affect them. Consequently, the re-
mainder of the discovery and trial preparation process can concen-
167. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at~~ 522-24. 
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trate on ascertaining the extent of the disadvantages that a handful 
of firms face because of the few significant mobility factors. 
From studies and other information developed by firms in the 
market or in related industries and from interviews of experts in the 
field, the techniques businesses utilize to estimate cost and risk dis-
advantage effects and time lags of particular mobility factors can 
often be ascertained. Those techniques can be used to prepare anal-
yses for trial showing the differential in unit cost resulting from a 
mobility factor and the period of time necessary to overcome it. In-
deed, simply knowing the basic facilities and equipment of the estab-
lished incumbents and of smaller competitors or potential entrants, 
production engineering experts may be able to prepare reasonable 
projections of cost differentials. Through such evidence and testi-
mony, counsel can develop a sound evidentiary record for estimating 
the degree and duration of the dominant incumbents' pricing flex-
ibility and, therefore, in conjunction with their market share, their 
market power. 
Litigants easily can adapt this approach to trial preparation to 
develop evidence concerning the extent, if any, that market power 
has been, or is likely to be, increased. In monopolization cases, for 
example, discovery and investigation to develop evidence on the al-
leged monopolist's current degree of market power can be expanded 
slightly to determine the extent to which the alleged monopolist's 
practices have created or increased the cost and risk disadvantages 
and time lags for the "advantaged" competitors and potential en-
trants. 168 Competitors in the industry and firms that have considered 
entry will ordinarily have substantial information on such effects be-
cause of their importance in business planning and strategy.169 
Estimating the degree to which a merger eliminating a potential 
entrant is likely to increase market power is even simpler. The same 
methodology is used as in determining the dominant incumbents' 
pricing flexibility, assessing the effects of mobility factors on the half-
dozen or so "most advantaged" potential entrants including the po-
tential entrant to be removed by merger. The extent to which the 
merging firm has less of a cost or risk disadvantage vis-a-vis the 
168. See text at note 70supra. As noted previously, some or all of the monopolistic prac-
tices that may heighten disadvantages and increase market power may nevertheless be unob-
jectionable if they are necessary to achieve or maintain its efficiencies. See text at note 64 
supra. 
169. In vertical merger cases, similar techniques could also be employed to estimate the 
extent of any increased market power - such as to show the increased cost disadvantage of 
fringe competitors if they are foreclosed from a large portion of the market and scale econo-
mies are important. See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at ~~ 1008-11. 
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dominant incumbents than all ( or almost all) other potential entrants 
will indicate the degree to which the major incumbents' pricing flex-
ibility is likely to be increased.170 And the extent to which the firm 
would require less time than other potential entrants to enter and 
overcome any significant cost or risk disadvantage provides an esti-
mate of the effect of the merger in increasing the duration of the 
incumbents' market power. 
3. Applying the Approach: An Example 
In many cases, this basic approach to trial preparation can, in 
fact, be fairly simple. An empirical demonstration of this occurred 
in the FTC case challenging Fruehauf s acquisition of Kelsey-
Hayes, 171 a major manufacturer of cast wheels for heavy-duty trucks 
and truck trailers. Counsel for Fruehauf initially interviewed two or 
three executives in the heavy-duty wheel industry and foundry ex-
perts to determine what facilities and expertise were necessary to de-
sign, produce, and sell the product as efficiently as the major 
incumbents. The interviews indicated that marketing posed no ob-
stacle to entry since the major purchasers were the truck and truck 
trailer manufacturers who bought exclusively on the basis of price. 
To manufacture wheels on a competitive basis, however, required a 
foundry with automated (or, at least, semi-automated) molding lines, 
thus raising possible concerns about scale economies and capital 
cost. 
To identify firms with major foundries which either had auto-
mated equipment or could add an automated molding line, Frue-
hauf retained a leading foundry consultant. While the consultant 
was preparing a list of such foundries, counsel for Fruehauf con-
ducted initial discovery and interviews of the small wheel manufac-
turers and of firms with well-known foundry capability such as 
General Motors and Ford, which have the largest foundry com-
plexes in the world. Then, based on the consultant's listing of foun-
dries, Fruehauf s counsel and the consultant visited five or six 
foundries representative of the principal categories of foundries the 
consultant had identified. 
After only a few weeks of interviews, the group of firms most 
capable of entry had become apparent: the highly automated iron 
foundries supplying the automotive and farm equipment industries. 
Consequently, at an early pre-trial stage, discovery and trial prepara-
170. See notes 77-86 supra and accompanying text. 
171. Fruehauf Corp., 91 F.T.C. 132 (1978), enforcement denied, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 
1979). 
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tion focused on developing estimates of the unit costs such firms 
could expect to achieve in wheel production, the capital investment 
necessary for them to enter, and the effect of economies of scale. 
With information about the types of production facilities employed 
by the existing wheel producers, both Fruehauf s foundry consultant 
and several managers of the automated iron foundries were able to 
predict with confidence that this group of foundries would require 
only minimal investment in standard machining equipment to enter 
and could produce at a unit cost at least as low as that of the estab-
lished manufacturers. In addition, the consultant and the foundry 
managers testified that these firms could avoid scale economies be-
cause the foundries had the capability of switching quickly from the 
production of wheels to their other product lines. In other words, 
their foundries could make as many or as few wheels as they wanted 
without increasing production costs.172 
Although the process of gathering the basic information and de-
veloping the evidence on the "advantaged" potential entrants took 
three or four months, it could have been completed in half that time 
had it been necessary to do so. While preparing a full evidentiary 
case concerning the effects of mobility factors may well prove some-
what more complicated and time consuming where cost or risk dis-
advantages of significance exist, it is difficult to believe that the 
process would require more than six months in all but exceptional 
circumstances. 173 
172. The FTC, however, found that entry into heavy-duty wheel production by the auto-
mated iron foundries was somehow a "sub-optimal" mode of entry. 91 F.T.C. 132, 233-34. 
Clearly, it was not "sub-optimal" in terms of production costs (id. at 233 n,26) but the Com-
mission believed that either in performance or in the minds of wheel purchasers there was a 
clear distinction between wheels made from ductile iron and those made from steel. Id. Ironi-
cally, the very evidence that the Administrative Law Judge and the Commission cited (Finding 
214 of the Initial Decision, id. at 183) indicated precisely the opposite - that major wheel 
purchasers deemed ductile iron and steel wheels to be identical in terms of both performance 
and consumer acceptance. 
Althougb noting the absence of any direct evidence corroborating this crucial finding, the 
Court of Appeals upheld it. The court inferred a preference for steel wheels because only one 
small wheel producer made wheels from ductile iron and because no other iron foundry had 
entered into wheel production. Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 357 (2d Cir. 1979), 
These facts, of course, could equally support just the opposite conclusion: that iron foundries 
have not expanded or entered because existing steel wheel manufacturers have held prices at a 
competitive level to forestall their expansion or entry. Indeed, given the record evidence show-
ing the absence of any discernible preference for steel wheels, the latter inference seems more 
reasonable. 
173. For example, detailed analyses of the revenue, cost, profitability, and risk effects of 
"hubbing'' on potential entrants into numerous Denver city-pairs were prepared in less than 
two months by both sides in the CAB's second Continental-Western merger case. See note 165 
supra. 
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B. Estimating Efficiencies to be Obtained by Merger 
Mobility factor analysis can also be used in many situations to 
estimate the extent to which a merger is likely to increase efficiencies. 
While efficiencies have never been held by the courts to justify a 
merger that would otherwise be illegal, the extent to which the courts 
should permit an "economies defense" is currently a topic of consid-
erable debate in the academic community.174 In the near future, 
courts will undoubtedly encounter arguments that they should per-
mit presumptively illegal mergers which are purportedly necessary 
for the merging parties to achieve substantial efficiencies. Whether 
or not those arguments should prevail where the merger would result 
in very large market shares, 175 ample justification exists for consider-
ing them where a merger would permit both partners to overcome a 
significant disadvantage vis-a-vis the principal incumbents.176 
Indeed, those types of mergers are unlikely to lessen competition. 
Assuming the inefficient firms' cost disadvantage is significant177 and 
not easily overcome,178 the firms are likely to be price-followers. In-
creasing the number of efficient firms that determine the price would 
make oligopolistic coordination in the market more difficult and 
174. Compare 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at~ 946; Edwards, supra note 8; 
Muris, supra note 92; Williamson, supra note 92 (all supporting an "economies defense") with 
R. BORK, supra note 7, at 125-27; R. POSNER, supra note 2 at 112-13; Fisher & Lande, Effi-
ciency Considerations in Merger E,iforcemenl, 91 YALE L.J. (1982) (forthcoming). 
175. A merger between two already dominant firms (with, for example, 40% of the market) 
could be claimed to increase efficiencies. The prospect that such a merger would greatly in-
crease the firms' market power and the potential for very effective coordination, however, runs 
substantial risk that the benefits of any increase in efficiencies will never be passed on to the 
consuming public. 
Most economists believe that the appropriate measure of the social cost of the merger is 
not, however, the monopoly overcharge but the "deadweight loss" resulting from the 
supracompetitive pricing. F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 459-60. Bui see Posner, The Social 
Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. PoL. ECON. 807 (1975). The monopolistic overcharge, 
in their view, is merely a shift of income from consumers to the industry's stockholders. The 
real welfare loss - termed "deadweight loss" - is the amount that consumers would be will-
ing to pay for the output that is no longer produced due to the monopolistic restriction of 
output. Thus, neither consumers nor producers derive any benefit from the "deadweight loss." 
F. SCHERER, supra note 3 at 460. 
~ince the "deadweight loss" is almost invariably much smaller than the monopoly over-
charge, the "deadweight loss" produced by even large increases in price can be more than 
offset by small decreases in cost. A 20% increase in price can be offset, for example, by a cost 
reduction of 1 % if market demand elasticity is 1/2, or 2% if elasticity is 1. Muris, supra note 92, 
at 387; Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: the Welfare Trade-o.fts, 58 AM. EcoN. 
REV. 18, 22-23 (1968). 
176. See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at ~ 940. 
177. Firms with a cost disadvantage of five percent or more are unlikely to be major fac-
tors in determining day-to-day pricing in the market. 
178. If the individual firms can achieve costs comparable to the dominant incumbents in a 
year or two, the effect of the merger is to decrease by one the number of firms that will deter-
mine the market price in the near future. 
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lower total costs for the industry, thereby achieving resource sav-
ings.179 That an "economies defense" is even necessary in these situ-
ations arises from the traditional preoccupation with market 
definitions and market shares without recognizing the importance of 
mobility factors in determining market power. If one also consid-
ered mobility factors, it would be readily apparent that the real pros-
pect for anticompetitive behavior relates to the collusive potential 
among the efficient firms, which presumably could maintain price 
significantly above cost without provoking increased output by less 
efficient rivals. 180 
However one may decide to analyze the situation - as an "econ-
omies defense" or a more sophisticated antitrust analysis - the cru-
cial issue is the extent to which the merging parties can reduce their 
disadvantage through the merger. Probably, the easiest and most re-
liable method of estimating the extent of increased efficiencies, if 
any, is to use a technique similar to that employed in determining 
the likely increase in market power due to the removal of a potential 
entrant. The method involves, :first, identifying the mobility factors 
which create disadvantages that the merger might reduce. Then, the 
probable increase in efficiencies can be estimated by ascertaining the 
extent of the individual merger partners' disadvantage compared to 
incumbent firms with attributes similar to those of the merged entity. 
C. The Potential to Simpl!fy and Streamline Litigation 
Even were mobility factor analysis to introduce some additional 
complexity into antitrust litigation, its use may well provide a sub-
stantial benefit by providing greater assurance that the antitrust laws 
would be rationally applied in merger and monopolization cases. 
But, in actual application, the proposed approach to mobility factor 
analysis should actually increase the manageability of major anti-
trust litigation and, in many cases, would permit the proceeding to 
be considerably simplified and streamlined. 
To understand why this is so, one must :first recognize the effect 
that the present absence of accepted standards for evaluating mobil-
ity factors has in antitrust cases. Understandably, litigants concen-
trate their efforts on the issues and evidence that they perceive as 
most important in determining the ultimate outcome of the case. Be-
cause market share and concentration are so often decisional in 
merger cases today, parties will tend to concentrate their time and 
179. 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at n 940. 
180. Id. at 148. 
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energy on the definition of the relevant market, inundating the court 
with evidence designed to tip the balance of the crucial line-drawing 
decision their way. 181 But, as noted previously, precise determina-
tion of the outer bounds of a market is rarely possible and, even 
where it is, the market concentration and market shares of the merg-
ing parties may not indicate the degree of market power or the po-
tential for oligopolistic coordination. 
Undeniably, much of the evidence usually presented by the par-
ties to persuade the court to adopt their market definitions relates to 
factors affecting new entry.182 Perusing the record of most merger 
cases, one will quickly realize that much of the trial is actually de-
voted to these factors. But, because the courts have no meaningful 
standards for evaluating their significance, litigants have a strong in-
centive to flood the courts with "impressionistic" testimony and evi-
dence detailing the many steps and the large amount of capital 
necessary to enter the market. This evidence is certainly relevant in a 
legal sense. As we have seen, however, it usually contributes little to 
the court's understanding of how entry conditions affect market 
power and of how much pricing flexibility the dominant incumbents 
possess. 
Use of the proposed analytical approach would fundamentally 
change those incentives and in most cases would actually assist the 
courts in managing and focusing the discovery and trial. With a dis-
ciplined and economically sound approach to analyzing mobility 
factors, parties are likely to perceive that market definition and mar-
ket shares alone may not determine the outcome, particularly in 
close cases. Consequently, they will have the incentive to channel 
some of the effort currently directed to "tipping the balance" on the 
market definition issue to developing meaningful evidence. Liti-
gants will also have a strong incentive to concentrate on establishing 
how the pertinent mobility factors affect those firms in the best posi-
tion to enter or expand and on demonstrating the resultant degree of 
market power. 
Moreover, courts concerned about maintaining control of the 
case and confining the scope of the inquiry into mobility factors can 
use a simple technique in managing the case. They can mer~ly re-
quire that, at a.ii early pre-trial conference or stage, the parties iden-
181. Markovits, supra note 14, at 602. 
182. Surely any evidence concerning cross-elasticity of supply to support (or refute) a pro-
posed market definition pertains to conditions affecting entry. Moreover, in most cases, liti-
gants attempt to buttress their cases with considerable additional evidence intended to 
demonstrate the ease or difficulty of entry. 
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tify those mobility factors that, they believe, permit the major 
incumbent firms to enjoy some degree of pricing flexibility, together 
with the names of the fringe incumbents and potential entrants that 
appear best situated to enter or expand. As noted previously, 183 a few 
weeks of basic investigation usually can identify the significant mo-
bility factors and the "most advantaged" potential entrants and 
fringe competitors. At the time they identify the significant mobility 
factors, the court should require the litigants to demonstrate ( either 
in writing or orally at the pre-trial conference) how each allegedly 
significant mobility factor permits pricing flexibility. If experienced 
counsel cannot provide a coherent explanation at that stage, one can 
be confident they will not be able to do so at trial. 
While the lists of mobility factors and firms may sometimes re-
quire modification later - such as where further discovery develops 
an unanticipated potential entrant - they serve to narrow the focus 
of the inquiry considerably in two respects. First, identifying the 
firms that each party believes are most capable of entry or expansion 
may well reveal that a particular mobility factor has no competitive 
significance. It may not affect the firms best situated to enter or ex-
pand, or they may have advantages in overcoming it. Second, the 
lists focus the discovery effort and trial preparation on the effect of 
_particular mobility factors on s_pec!fic firms or groups of firms. The 
examination of mobility factors is thereby limited in scope and con-
centrated on specific factual issues even before full discovery has 
begun. 
Since the determinative issues in several types of structural cases 
relate primarily to mobility factors, many of these cases could also be 
simplified considerably. This, in fact, has been the experience of the 
Civil Aeronautics Board in recent airline merger cases where it has 
applied the same standards as those embodied in the Clayton Act. 
By making it clear to the parties that its primary concern was the 
effect of mobility factors on potential entrants, the Board has re-
duced the scope of its merger cases considerably while, at the same 
time, prompting litigants to develop very inf orm.ative trial records on 
the competitive implications of the pertinent mobility factors. 184 
A similar approach by the courts may streamline litigation where 
it is likely that issues relating to mobility factors will be important, if 
not determinative. The potential for focusing litigation is particu-
larly great in monopolization and vertical and potential competition 
183. See Part III-A-2 supra. 
184. See Continental-Western Merger Case, CAB No. 38733, slip. op. at 4-5 (September 
24, 1980); note 165 supra. 
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merger cases. In those cases, the decisional issues usually relate al-
most exclusively to mobility factors. Thus, by prompting the parties 
to recognize the importance of mobility factors from the outset of the 
litigation and by using the principles of mobility factor analysis to 
limit and manage that aspect of the case, courts may be able to sim-
plify and streamline litigation in major structural cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Consideration of the competitive and efficiency implications of 
mobility factors is essential to reasoned decision-making in struc-
tural antitrust cases. Yet, having no economically sound and practi-
cal approach for analyzing mobility factors in litigated cases, courts 
and litigants have placed primary reliance on concentration and 
market share information which are often very misleading indicators 
of market power. As a result, there is a serious risk that the antitrust 
laws may be perversely applied. Mergers and practices that portend 
substantial reduction in competition may well be permitted while 
those with little or no prospect of injuring consumer welfare are 
prohibited. 
In an attempt to deal with this problem, I have proposed an ap-
proach, based on accepted economic theory, for integrating sound 
mobility factor analysis into structural case litigation. Use of the pro-
posed approach should not only assist courts in analyzing mobility 
factors but should also encourage litigants to develop evidentiary 
records that provide meaningful information about the extent of 
market power. 
